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THEORY AND REVIEW
CARROTS AND RAINBOWS:  MOTIVATION AND SOCIAL
PRACTICE IN OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT1
Georg von Krogh, Stefan Haefliger, Sebastian Spaeth, and Martin W. Wallin
ETH Zurich, SWITZERLAND  {gvkrogh@ethz.ch}  {shaefliger@ethz.ch}  {sspaeth@ethz.ch}  {mwallin@ethz.ch}
Open source software (OSS) is a social and economic phenomenon that raises fundamental questions about
the motivations of contributors to information systems development.  Some developers are unpaid volunteers
who seek to solve their own technical problems, while others create OSS as part of their employment contract. 
For the past 10 years, a substantial amount of academic work has theorized about and empirically examined
developer motivations.  We review this work and suggest considering motivation in terms of the values of the
social practice in which developers participate.  Based on the social philosophy of Alasdair MacIntyre, we
construct a theoretical framework that expands our assumptions about individual motivation to include the idea
of a long-term, value-informed quest beyond short-term rewards.  This motivation–practice framework depicts
how the social practice and its supporting institutions mediate between individual motivation and outcome. 
The framework contains three theoretical conjectures that seek to explain how collectively elaborated standards
of excellence prompt developers to produce high-quality software, change institutions, and sustain OSS
development.  From the framework, we derive six concrete propositions and suggest a new research agenda
on motivation in OSS.
Keywords:  Free software, incentives, MacIntyre, motivation, open source software, innovation, social practice
Introduction1
Over the last 20 years, open source software (OSS) products
have made successful inroads into many information systems
(IS) segments, attracting millions of users.  OSS, broadly
defined, is software where users can inspect the source code,
modify it, and redistribute modified or unmodified versions
for others to use.  Today, firms are both heavy users of OSS
products and contributors to their development.  As a result,
IS managers are increasingly dependent on development
resources outside their direct control, giving them reason to be
concerned about what motivates developers outside the firm,
many as volunteers, to participate in the creation of OSS.  For
example, if a firm decides to invest millions of dollars to
migrate its servers to a Linux system, managers will want to
know to what extent Linux will continue to receive contri-
butions from individuals and companies, how the software
will evolve, and if the OSS projects involved will manage to
release new and improved versions of the software regularly. 
Thus, IS managers should be interested in the question
formulated by Lerner and Tirole (2002) which points to the
very existence of the OSS phenomenon:  “Why would thou-
sands of top-notch software developers contribute for free to
the creation of a public good?”  A public good, here, is
defined by its non-excludability and non-rivalry in consump-
tion, which applies to software published and licensed under
an open source license.  Lerner and Tirole’s question poses
huge challenges for scholars studying IS development within
firms that systematically rely on pay and career incentives. 
Answering this question explains a phenomenon of high
academic and practical interest and much research on motiva-
tion in OSS has already shed considerable light on critical
1M. Lynne Markus was the accepting senior editor for this paper.  Jan Pries-
Heje served as the associate editor.
The appendices for this paper are located in the “Online Supplements”
section of the MIS Quarterly’s website (http://www.misq.org).
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issues regarding contributions to OSS projects and the
emergence and growth of OSS projects and their organization
(e.g., Hertel et al. 2003; Markus 2007; Ulhøi 2004; West and
O’Mahony 2005).
In this paper, we review the literature on motivation to con-
tribute to the development of OSS.  The review shows that the
existing literature does not provide satisfactory answers to
three differentiated questions as to why this phenomenon
exists (see Lerner and Tirole 2002): First, why do OSS
developers produce high-quality software when they do?  This
question is warranted because software quality is critical for
attracting interest in OSS, as high-quality OSS systems make
headlines due to their developers’ achievements in terms of
reliability, speed, accessibility, and more.  For example, the
world’s largest stock exchanges run Linux systems while
racing for trading speed records (King 2010; Vaughn-Nichols
2009) and 75 percent of the world’s websites are served by
OSS web servers.  However, as our review will show, while
the existing literature informs us well about how developers
are intrinsically and extrinsically motivated to contribute by
means of time, effort, and code contributions, little is known
about why they develop high-quality OSS when they do.
Second, why do OSS developers change institutions?  A
significant impact of the phenomenon on business and public
administration stems from the nature of the free and OSS
licenses that define and govern their potential use.2  Public
administrators perceive value in the free accessibility of OSS
(Comino et al. 2010; Maldonado 2010) and firms have long
used and contributed to OSS (Bonaccorsi et al. 2006;
Dahlander and Wallin 2006; Henkel 2006; Rolandsson et al.
2011; Stam 2009) as part of a model of innovation that has
become known as private–collective (von Hippel and von
Krogh 2003).  Thus, it is critical to explain why OSS devel-
opers set up OS licenses, organizations, and foundations and
thus create new institutions that house what they do and
make.  However, while existing academic work explains how
institutions constrain developers’ motivation, it does not
address more broadly how developers are motivated to change
institutions.  
Third, why do developers sustain OSS development?  This
question is critical because the answer indicates whether firms
and individual users can expect future development of the
software products in use today.3  In this regard, volunteering
OSS developers may constitute an unstable development
resource as they can stop development or leave the project
anytime.  Developers may also suddenly and opportunistically
alter their sharing behavior (Osterloh and Rota 2007).  How-
ever, so far, theory and research have not investigated in
much detail why OSS developers engage in activities that
guarantee the survival and sustainment of the OSS develop-
ment practice.
In order to explore the three questions, we first review
existing literature on motivation to contribute to OSS devel-
opment and subsequently advance a new theoretical frame-
work that deepens, enriches, and reinvigorates research on
motivation in OSS.  We show that the concepts of individual
motivation and social practice are mutually constitutive, and
argue that theory and research should incorporate a social
practice perspective that focuses on action to explain how
shared beliefs are created through shared work (MacIntyre
1981; Orlikowski 2005; Rouse 2007), rather than reducing
motivation studies to a conventional model that relies on
short-term intrinsic and extrinsic motivation (e.g., Hars and
Ou 2002).  A simple analogy illustrates our argument: 
Humans often act to satisfy their immediate needs and might
fall for the dangling carrot.  Occasionally, humans also make
elaborate detours, strive for bigger things in life, and
undertake long voyages to find the gold at the end of the
rainbow (even though they know it is not there).  They value
the journey, perceive unity in the sum of their efforts, and
manage their life so that they can reflect upon it as well lived
in a social practice.  The new theoretical framework we put
forward is based on the social philosophy of Alasdair
MacIntyre.  MacIntyre’s perspective of social practice and
motivation rests on a belief that human behavior cannot be
decoupled from ethical considerations about what people
strive for and the narratives they construct about their life.
His work provides three important conceptual building
blocks—goods, institutions, and social practice—that assist in
the analysis of motivation to act.  While much is known about
the direct link between individual motivation and output in the
form of, for example, submitting new or modified code to
OSS projects, much less is known about how motivation is
intertwined with forms of cooperative human activity (which
we analyze through MacIntyre’s concepts of social practice
and institution) and a broader set of related outputs, including
high-quality technology for public use (which we analyze
through his concept of good).
With regard to motivation, OSS differs from traditional soft-
ware development in firms along three dimensions:  incen-
tives, control, and coordination mechanisms.  First, to moti-
vate software development, firms rely on pay and career
incentives, and other benefits stipulated as part of employ-
2For information about the OSS initiative and licenses see http://www.
opensource.org/.
3See The Economist, May 16, 2006, “Open, but Not as Usual”
(http://www.economist.com/node/5624944?story_id=5624944).
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ment contracts (e.g., Peters 2003).  The presence of a signi-
ficant number of volunteers in OSS development (Hars and
Ou 2002; Lakhani and Wolf 2005) limits the effectiveness of
incentives to firm employees; volunteers find motivation
elsewhere.  Second, and related to the use of incentives,
software development firms implement control mechanisms,
including behavior- or output-based control (see Ouchi 1978).
The lack of formal governance and mandatory or formal
membership by volunteers excludes managers from exerting
control in an OSS project following these traditional ways
(Markus 2007).  OSS is predominantly characterized by clan
control, which is based on common values and beliefs (Ouchi
1980), or self-control, based on self-monitoring (Kirsch 1996;
Ouchi 1979).  Third, firms tend to coordinate software devel-
opment projects through organizational hierarchy and cen-
tralized planning (Cusumano and Selby 1995).  In contrast,
coordinating the work of distributed OSS developers hinges
on their ability to exchange information over the Internet at
low cost (Bonaccorsi and Rossi 2003).  A set of rather simple
tools, such as concurrent versioning systems and mailing lists,
are used for coordination at the level of information exchange
(Lee and Cole 2003).
These three dimensions illustrate differences that can be
expected between the social practice of OSS development and
what is normally associated with software development in
firms and software engineering (Scacci 2002).  Moreover, the
social practice of OSS development is saturated with ethical
aspects.  Historically, open source software grew out of the
Free Software movement founded by Richard M.  Stallman,
which was primarily driven by ethical considerations; running
software that a user cannot inspect, modify, and share is con-
sidered immoral.  Developers who identify themselves with
the Free, or Libre, Software movement are often motivated by
the desire to allow users to control the software they require
(Stewart and Gosain 2006).  Thus, motivation of OSS
developers should also be studied from the perspective of the
social practice in which the development work collectively
unfolds, evolves, and heeds ethical considerations (Rouse
2007).  In the following, we will argue that MacIntyre’s
theory accomplishes precisely this task.
Next, we describe the method used for the review and
examine existing theory and research, which predominately
covers the link between motivation and contribution and, to
a far lesser extent, the link between motivation, quality,
institutions, and sustainable practice.  Subsequently, we intro-
duce and critique MacIntyre’s theory, which is suited to
further exploration of our three questions pertaining to moti-
vation.  In a fourth section, we develop a new motivation–
practice framework that allows us to answer these three
questions.  The framework contains a set of theoretical con-
jectures from which we derive concrete propositions and
suggest new research opportunities.  The last section
concludes the paper.
Research on Open Source
and Motivation
Review Method
We performed a literature review of publications pertaining
to motivation in OSS.  The review aimed to (1) reveal in what
way and to what degree literature has addressed the three
questions we posed in the “Introduction”; (2) organize and
classify received literature according to topics covered and
their theoretical underpinnings, focusing on motivational
aspects; and (3) identify gaps in the current literature that
justify the creation of a new framework.
The review stages conducted correspond to those recom-
mended by Cooper (1998): problem formulation, data collec-
tion, data evaluation, analysis, and presentation.  In doing so,
we were able to take advantage of the suggestions and poten-
tial pitfalls associated with each stage of the review.  The
reviewed papers originated in different disciplines, including
organization and management theory, anthropology, econo-
mics, law, psychology, and sociology, and applied a variety
of qualitative and quantitative research designs.  We therefore
report the data and methods used for each paper reviewed
(See Appendix A).
We adopted a broad hierarchical search strategy to capture
high-quality and relevant articles starting with the most
reliable sources and, in subsequent searches, adding articles
not previously identified.  The search strategy followed four
main steps (the first three were carried out on June 22, 2009,
while the papers in the fourth category were added on a
continuous basis).  First, we identified all articles listed in the
ISI Web of Knowledge database published by Thomson
Reuters containing the terms open source, motivation, or
incentive(s) in the title, abstract, or keywords.  This index is
the most critical source of published material since it contains
published and peer-reviewed articles.  The initial search
yielded 214 articles; we excluded those that did not speci-
fically deal with the relationship between motivation and
OSS.  Search results that described software that happened to
be open source were also excluded, as were articles that
focused exclusively on technical issues.
Our review focused on motivation in the practice of software
development under open source licenses and excluded other
MIS Quarterly Vol. 36 No. 2/June 2012 651
von Krogh et al./Motivation and Social Practice in OSS Development
activities carried out in electronic networks of practice
(Wasko and Faraj 2005), online communities (Wiertz and de
Ruyter 2007), and social networks sites more generally (Boyd
and Ellison 2007).  While motivation patterns might be
similar across various activities, we have no inclination to
combine in one review motivation studies in different
practices simply because they might occur online or share
volunteer contributions.  In total, we included 26 articles from
the ISI Web of Knowledge database.  Second, we browsed the
paper repository at http://opensource.mit.edu (no longer on-
line) to identify articles that matched the ISI search criteria. 
This online paper repository was a major source of unpub-
lished papers and work in progress dealing with OSS.  We
included eight articles from this source.
Third, in order to be more comprehensive, we searched
Google Scholar with the combined search terms open source
and motivation. Google Scholar searches the scholarly
literature and identifies articles from multiple disciplines and
sources:  peer-reviewed papers, theses, books, abstracts, and
articles, from academic publishers, professional societies,
preprint repositories, universities, and other scholarly organi-
zations.  The initial search yielded 38,900 (often duplicated)
articles.  Because of the vast number of articles identified, we
opted to retain only the top 200 articles.  Google Scholar
ranks articles
the way researchers do, weighing the full text of
each article, the author, the publication in which the
article appears, and how often the piece has been
cited in other scholarly literature.  The most relevant
results will always appear on the first page.4
In line with the two previous searches we excluded articles
not specifically dealing with the relationship between
motivation and OSS.  We included one additional article that
appeared only in Google Scholar.  In addition, we searched
Google Scholar using slightly different search phrases, such
as incentive and open source software.  However, this search
failed to yield any relevant articles to add to the full sample. 
Fourth, we included topical conference papers and book
chapters that were known to us and colleagues in the field
(and which had escaped the previous identification).  This
yielded six additional articles.
Finally, we only included English-language documents, which
led to the exclusion of one ISI paper.  The search strategy led
to 40 articles in our review sample, with a comprehensive
inclusion of empirical contributions but a selective inclusion
of purely theoretical contributions.  The sample included all
articles that empirically investigate the relationship between
motivation and OSS development but excluded nonempirical,
non-ISI articles that do not develop new theoretical categories
or explanations.  Conceptual papers were examined for moti-
vational factors that were used to create theory.  Motivational
factors that proved relevant in empirical papers were also
included in the review.
We coded all papers according to motivational aspects
covered, as well as to how they regarded institutional context.
For example, surveys proposing “I am contributing software
because I learn from receiving feedback on my work” led to
the creation of a “learning” dimension of individuals’ motiva-
tions to contribute.  If a study used a different terminology,
but the specific motivation seemed sufficiently close to an
existing one in the taxonomy, it was merged into the existing
category.  After a first round, we convened and performed a
triage of all studies and motivational dimensions, merging
them when they seemed to express the same type of motiva-
tion.  This led to a final typology of 10 clusters related to
individual motivation.  As a final step, we decided whether
each cluster covered intrinsic motivation, internalized
extrinsic motivation, or extrinsic motivation.
While reviewing the articles, we also categorized topics
relating to institutions (which are outside of the direct control
of a single individual), leading to a list of five dimensions, as
discussed later.  A complete list of papers included, with a
brief description of methods and data used, is included in the
Appendix A.
The Motivation to Contribute
Studies of individual motivation to contribute to OSS
development were grouped into 10 motivational categories. 
We also examined the frameworks used to justify and cate-
gorize motivations.  While a wide variety has been used, the
most frequent framework by far has been the distinction be-
tween intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in self-determination
theory (SDT) (see Deci and Ryan 1985; Gagné and Deci
2005).  This distinction is based on different reasons that
bring about human action.  An action is extrinsically moti-
vated when it is performed to obtain some separable outcome,
whereas an action is intrinsically motivated when it is done
for the inherent interest or joy of performing it (Deci and
Ryan 1985).  A number of empirical studies have shown that
OSS developers have both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations
for contributing to its development (Hars and Ou 2002;
Lakhani and Wolf 2005; Roberts et al. 2006; Wu et al. 2007),
4Http://scholar.google.com/intl/en/scholar/about.html, retrieved June 22,
2009.
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and we summarize how some of the works make use of SDT.
Following Lindenberg (2001) and Lakhani and Wolf (2005),
Osterloh and Rota (2007) distinguished between enjoyment-
based intrinsic motivation and obligation-based or
community-based intrinsic motivation.  Their paper provided
a theoretical overview, whereas Lakhani and Wolf presented
survey data showing that both types of intrinsic motivation, as
well as extrinsic motivation, impacted on work effort.  Wu et
al. (2007) also used the SDT framework to explain the
continued intention to contribute to OSS projects.
Most of the studies using SDT focused on intrinsic motiva-
tions.  For instance, Hars and Ou (2002) suggested that
intrinsically motivated developers spend more time and effort
in open source projects than extrinsically motivated devel-
opers, but did not examine this empirically.  Other empirical
studies concentrated on intrinsic motivation rather than
extrinsic motivation.  For example, Lakhani and von Hippel
(2003) linked feelings of competence and fun to willingness
to help other developers.  Authors have also viewed motiva-
tion in relation to reciprocity, for example, giving software
patches as “gifts” to the community (Bergquist and Ljungberg
2001; Wu et al. 2007); reciprocal helping behavior (i.e.,
helping because of having been helped or expecting to be
helped) (Lakhani and von Hippel 2003); or status motivation
(Roberts et al. 2006).  This work stands in contrast to Lerner
and Tirole’s (2002) early explanation of contribution, purely
based on extrinsic motivation.  Few of the works on intrinsic
motivation looked at how institutional context shapes moti-
vations (and incentivizes to create or change institutions).
While alternative frameworks have been proposed, they are
often closely related to Deci and Ryan’s original framework
of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation.  For example, Bonac-
corsi et al. (2006) distinguished between economic, social,
and technological motivation, building on a taxonomy pro-
posed by Feller and Fitzgerald (2002).  Economic motivation
is similar to extrinsic motivation, while social motivation
roughly corresponds to intrinsic motivation.  The authors also
suggested a third type—technological motivation—that
includes benefits from learning and working with a “bleeding-
edge” technology.
Attempts to develop a broader and integrative framework can
be found in Hemetsberger (2004) and Hertel et al. (2003).
Hemetsberger viewed motivation as “self-interest” and
“others-orientation.”  Self-interest was further divided into
task- and product-related motivation (corresponding to
intrinsic motivation); others-orientation, including long-term
utilitarian goals and social significance (corresponding to
extrinsic motivation), was divided into internalized group
goals and values, and socio-emotional relationships.  Hertel
et al. extended a model of voluntary action in social move-
ments proposed by Klandermans (1997).  The authors
included collective, norm-oriented, reward, and identification
motives, and combined these with the “VIST-model” (Hertel
2002) that explains individual motivation in virtual teams.5
These frameworks go beyond self-determination theory in
specific aspects but do not answer any of the three questions
we developed in the previous section.
Most of the work on motivation based on the intrinsic/ extrin-
sic framework can be grouped into intrinsic motivation,
internalized extrinsic motivation, or extrinsic motivation (see
Table 1 for an overview of the resulting dimensions).  Some
motivations are by definition extrinsic but developers could
internalize them, so that they are perceived as self-regulating
behavior rather than external impositions (Deci and Ryan
1987; Roberts et al. 2006).  These internalized extrinsic moti-
vations include reputation, reciprocity, learning, and own-use
value.  Pure extrinsic motivations include careers and pay.
The specific dimensions with key empirical findings of the
papers in our sample are summarized in Appendices B, C,
and D.
Interaction among motivation factors has been given less
attention, with the notable exception of crowding theory (Frey
and Jegen 2001), which predicts mutual adjustments between
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation; introducing pecuniary in-
centives may not always increase the supply of a public good
(Frey and Jegen 2001).  Osterloh and Rota (2007) argued that
extrinsic motivation might crowd out voluntary sharing of
software and other knowledge.  Several surveys have shown
that around 40 percent of the contributions to OSS emanate
from paid working time (Hars and Ou 2002; Hertel et al.
2003; Lakhani and Wolf 2005; Luthiger and Jungwirth 2007). 
However, crowding out of intrinsic motivations cannot be
detected in empirical studies so far.  Lakhani and Wolf found
that intrinsic and extrinsic motivations coexist, and Roberts et
al. (2006) detected no crowding out of intrinsic motivation by
extrinsic motivation.  Osterloh and Rota argued that this
might be due to a balance between intrinsic and extrinsic
motivations and the “pro-social intrinsic motivation of a
sufficient number of participants to contribute [enforcing the
rules of cooperation]” (p. 196).  Increased reputation and
career concerns (status motivation) even enhance developers’
intrinsic motivations, although extrinsic motivation does
crowd out “own-use value” motivation (a form of internalized
extrinsic motivation) (Roberts et al. 2006).
5VIST stands for valence (the subjective evaluation of goals), instrumentality
(the perceived importance of one’s own contribution), self-efficacy (team
members’ perceived ability to perform the required activities for the team
task), and trust (the expectation of reciprocity rather than exploitation).
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Table 1.  Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations
 Intrinsic Internalized Extrinsic Extrinsic
 Ideology Altruism Kinship Fun Reputation Reciprocity Learning Own-use Career Pay
Alexy and Leitner 2007 
Baldwin and Clark 2006
Benkler 2002  
Berquist and Ljungberg 2001 
Bitzer et al. 2007  
David and Shapiro 2008     
David et al. 2003    
Fershtman and Gandal 2004
Ghosh 2005       
Hars and Ou 2002      
Haruvy et al. 2003 
Hemetsberger 2004         
Hertel et al. 2003       
Ke and Zhang 2008 
Lakhani and von Hippel 2003     
Lakhani and Wolf 2005         
Lattemann and Stieglitz 2005   
Lee and Cole 2003
Lerner and Tirole 2002  
Luthiger and Jungwirth 2007  
Markus 2007
Okoli and Oh 2007 
O’Mahony and Ferraro 2007
Oreg and Nov 2008   
Osterloh and Rota 2007  
Riehle 2007 
Roberts et al. 2006      
Rullani 2007
Schofield and Cooper 2006   
Shah 2006     
Spaeth et al. 2008  
Stewart et al. 2006
Stewart and Gosain 2006    
von Hippel and von Krogh
2003   
von Krogh et al. 2003
Wu et al. 2007    
Xu et al. 2009     
Ye and Kishida 2003 
Yu et al. 2007      
Zeitlyn 2003 
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To conclude, while research on motivation in OSS generated
a clear link between extrinsic and intrinsic motives and
contributions, it did not relate individual motivation to the
quality of the contributions made.  This leaves our first
question (How and why do OSS developers produce high-
quality software when they do?) unanswered.
Motivation, Institutions, and Social Practice
OSS development is a form of collective action that shapes
institutions, and in turn enables individuals to contribute (von
Hippel and von Krogh 2003).  Decades of research into other
forms of collective action, ranging from lobbying and
preservation of natural resources, to money collection for a
good cause, have shown that institutions and individual
motivations are interrelated (e.g., Morris and Mueller 1992).
As a result, we believe that it is important to investigate both
the individual level and the social context of development in
order to understand individual behavior in a social practice.
This section reports on our findings on the relations between
motivation, institutions, and social practice in the literature
reviewed.
The research reviewed here mostly investigates why devel-
opers are moved to contribute to OSS development.  How-
ever, it has disregarded potential external influences and
interferences, and focuses instead on the underlying needs,
wishes, and goal orientations of individuals.  Early on,
though, Deci and Ryan (1985) pointed to the link between a
context (the external environment) and individual motivation.
In self-determination theory, extrinsic and intrinsic motiva-
tions are both predictors and outcomes of institutional
arrangements such as governance or norms, depending on
“the nature of the study and the way and time in which self-
determined motivation is measured” (Sheldon and Krieger
2007, p. 885).  Accordingly, some OSS scholars have recently
moved beyond the direct link between motivation and contri-
bution, and investigated factors that enable and constrain
motivation and contribution to OSS.  These factors are
external to individuals and often beyond their direct control,
impacting indirectly on OSS contributions.  They do so either
by influencing individual motivation or moderating its effect.
While some authors discuss the interrelationship between the
motivation of OSS developers and contextual factors that
impact on development, most of this work is recent and
difficult to categorize (e.g., Shah 2006; von Hippel and von
Krogh 2003).  Yet, our review was able to identify five kinds
of contextual factors of relevance to our second question
(Why do OSS developers change institutions?) and the third
(Why do developers sustain OSS development?).
First, a few studies related motivation to institutions in terms
of governance, community sponsorship, the provision of
rewards, and license restriction.  Markus (2007, p. 152)
defined OSS governance as
the means of achieving the direction, control, and
coordination of wholly or partially autonomous
individuals and organizations on behalf of an OSS
development project to which they jointly
contribute.
While governance in OSS has been described in terms of
structure, practices, rules, and norms, it leaves unanswered an
important question relating directly to motivation: What is the
source of control in OSS development communities (Markus
2007, p. 153)?  As well as exerting control, the creation of
routines and rules impacts on developers’ voluntary engage-
ment and motivation.  Markus’s question also points to the
organizational sponsorship of OSS development.  Shah (2006)
distinguished between “open” and “gated” source com-
munities, where gated refers to developers’ limited access to
the development process, due to firm sponsorship and control.
She found that, in the long run, developers who are mainly
motivated by use value tend to contribute to gated source
communities, whereas developers mainly motivated by
enjoyment contribute to open source communities.  Stewart et
al. (2006) investigated the role of community sponsorship and
distinguished between market (e.g., firm) and nonmarket (e.g.,
university) sponsors and concluded that developers pick up
cues as to the project’s future from the type of sponsor, im-
pacting incentives to contribute.  For example, they found that
projects with a nonmarket sponsor attracted greater develop-
ment activity than projects without a sponsor.  How contribu-
tions are rewarded also seems to matter.  Alexy and Leitner
(2011) criticized existing OSS literature for assuming that
intrinsic motivation and extrinsic financial rewards have a
one-dimensionally positive effect on the motivation of indi-
vidual developers; they claimed that payment norms moderate
the effect on intrinsic and total motivation.  It has also been
found that license restriction impacts on developers’ moti-
vations, in the sense that less restrictive licenses tend to attract
more development activity to a project (Fershtman and
Gandal 2007; Stewart et al. 2006).  The literature reviewed
thus far considers institutions as constraints to motivation and
has studied the interaction and interference that governance,
community sponsorship, provision of rewards, and license
restrictions inflict on individual motivation.  That is, causality
has been established between the way institutions impact on
motivation and human behavior.  However, the opposite
causal direction has not been investigated although it is
known that OSS developers set up governance structure
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(O’Mahony and Ferraro 2007).  This means that Question 2
(Why do OSS developers change institutions?) remains
unanswered.
Second, a number of studies related motivation to norms and
exposure to a specific community.  The literature reviewed
identifies social and technical exposure to a community that
over time creates opportunities, in terms of advancement
within the community’s social structure (Rullani 2007; von
Krogh et al. 2003) and of insights that can lead to more
challenging tasks (Shah 2006).  To get their work accepted by
established developers and to be able to exert influence on the
technical design in the project, newcomers have to adhere to
behavioral scripts for joining the community.  Learning about
and following “joining scripts” takes time for developers, but
this time is essential if they are to advance to community
leadership or other central positions (von Krogh et al. 2003). 
Although this literature approaches the idea of a social prac-
tice, Question 3 (Why do OSS developers sustain the social
practice of OSS development?) remains unanswered.
Reviewing state-of-the-art literature, we identified five dimen-
sions (governance, community sponsorship, provision of
rewards, license restrictions, and social and technical expo-
sure to the community) associated with institution and social
practice that impact on motivation to contribute source code
(see Table 2).  However, little is yet known about what moves
OSS developers to (1) produce high-quality work when they
do, (2) engage in institutional change, or (3) sustain OSS
development.  In order to address these issues, we suggest
research to take a social practice perspective on OSS
development.
To summarize, individual motivation rooted in people’s
search for immediate outcomes is important but does not
suffice to explain critical facets of the OSS phenomenon.  The
OSS phenomenon initially triggered research on contributors’
motivation from a self-determination perspective, but to get
more differentiated explanations we may need to look beyond
this dominating perspective.  Some of the work reviewed
represents a first step toward taking into account institutions
and practice; yet it seems that the emergence of institutions
through social practice, and their interactions in OSS devel-
opment, are currently not well understood.  A perspective that
explicitly engages with these interactions can be found in the
social philosophy of Alastair MacIntyre, which we introduce
in the following section.  Subsequently, we develop a frame-
work that contains theoretical conjectures from which we
derive concrete propositions.  The framework fills the iden-
tified research gap and thus answers the three questions posed
in the “Introduction.”
OSS Development:  Conceptual
Building Blocks
In recent years, scholars have increasingly shown interest in
the influence of social practices on the evolution of economy
and society, often referred to as the “practice turn” in the
social sciences (Schatzki et al. 2001).  The practice turn has
also influenced theorizing in IS development and use (e.g.,
Kellogg et al. 2006; Orlikowski 2000; Suchman et al. 1999)
and stimulated theory development on human motivation that
takes into account the relationship of passionate individuals
engaging in their social practices and the role individuals play
in the institutionalizing power of social practices (Brown and
Duguid 1991).  The practice turn describes the work of social
scientists who attempt to articulate relationships between
individual activities, structures, and matter (for example, rules
or physical bodies) that have been separated by various
dualisms (such as structuralism or methodological individ-
ualism).  Alasdair MacIntyre’s seminal work After Virtue
(1981) presents a theory that extends and links aspects from
the social practice perspective.  The theory includes an ethical
dimension to the discussion of quality in the goods produced
by motivated individuals in a social practice that is either
enabled or constrained by institutions (Knight 1998).
MacIntyre’s work has had wide-ranging implications for
several fields, including sociology, political science, educa-
tion, religious studies, and business ethics (for a discussion
and introduction, see Knight 1998).  His perspective on
human motivation is rooted in moral philosophy, in particular
virtue ethics, which concerns the knowledge of how to live a
good life (MacIntyre 1981).  As we showed in the last section,
motivation is often considered a psychological reaction
aroused in human beings that make us act in the direction of
a specific goal.  However, according to MacIntyre, under-
standing what people do (or do not do) and why they do it
cannot be decoupled from an analysis of ethical considera-
tions, such as what they strive for in life, the narratives they
construct about their life, and why these are worthwhile to
them and others. The theory builds on, and criticizes,
Aristotelean value ethics by arguing from a more relativistic
and process-based point of view.  Furthermore, he takes a
dynamic and historical perspective that is rare in mainstream
motivation studies and explores the role of institutions and
social practices in shaping virtues.
More specifically for our purpose, MacIntyre’s theory is use-
ful for analyzing motivation in the context of OSS develop-
ment because it raises questions of ethics that guide the
activities of people, institutions, and social practices.  As
shown by Stewart and Gosain (2006), OSS developers often
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Table 2.  Institutions and Social Practice
Governance Governance refers to “the means of achieving the direction, control, and coordination of wholly or partially
autonomous individuals and organizations on behalf of an OSS development project to which they jointly
contribute” (Markus 2007, p. 152).
Key empirical findings:
• Benkler (2002) argued that peer production has a relative advantage over firm- or market-based
production because of the highly variable nature of human capital and lower costs of coordination and
communication.
• Lattemann and Stieglitz (2005) argued that the adequacy of governance tools is related to the motivational
preferences of participants and that behavioral and output control should be regarded as secondary to
social control in the form of morals and cultural rules.
• Lerner and Tirole (2002) argued that the success of an OSS project is dependent on its ability to break
it into distinct components as well as the presence of a credible leader or leadership.  They suggest that
code modularity enables the former and exemplifies the latter with projects characterized by authority or
consensus.  
• Markus (2007) suggested three purposes of OSS governance: Solving collective action problems, solving
coordination problems, and creating a better climate for contributors.  Her review also suggested a
framework for future comparative and case study research on OSS governance.  
• O’Mahony and Ferraro (2007) concluded that, contrary to common belief, the contributions the community
valued the most were not purely technical.  The study showed that over time a governance structure
emerged that valued the informal work of coordinating individual efforts and linking them to community
goals.  In doing so, the members developed a shared basis of formal authority but limited it with
democratic mechanisms.
• Shah (2006) distinguished between open and gated software communities, performing a qualitative study
of both, and found that the difference in governance structure affects the participation choices of volunteer
OSS developers.  In addition, she found that in the long run, developers who were mainly motivated by
use-value tended to contribute to gated source communities, whereas developers mainly motivated by
enjoyment contributed to open source communities.  Considerations of fairness and reciprocity explain
this behavior.  The developers were aware of the property rights situation in the gated source communities
and suspected firms of acting “strategically,” that is, neglecting the needs of the community and pursuing
their economic interests.  Thus, developers in gated source communities contributed only if they derived
direct use-value from their work.
Community
sponsorship
Sponsorship refers to control by an organization, such as a firm, over the development process, source code
accessibility, or code ownership.
Key empirical findings:
• Shah (2006) studied open and gated software communities and argued that firms may encounter
difficulties if they seek to construct hybrid arrangements that balance community-based value creation with
private value appropriation.
• Stewart et al. (2006) found that community sponsorship and licensing address complementary developer
motivations, so that the influence of licensing on development activity depends on what kind of
organizational sponsor a project has.  In addition, OSS projects with sponsors—non-market sponsors in
particular—attract more attention.
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Table 2.  Institutions and Social Practice (Continued)
Provision of
rewards
The provision of rewards refers to incentive structure, i.e., how someone other than the developer is rewarded
for participation in OSS development.
Key empirical findings:
• Alexy and Leitner (2011) found that payment norms moderate the effect on motivation.  In particular they
studied the impact of rewards and payment norms within a community on developers’ intentions to
contribute to an OSS project.  They found that payment exhibited a positive effect on developers’ total
motivation when they were offered a monetary reward on completion as long as payment was not strongly
expected.  At the same time intrinsic motivation only decreased for that share of the sample that received
payment, which also perceived the existence of social norms refuting payment.
• Benkler (2002) distinguished between, and related, monetary rewards, intrinsic hedonic rewards, and
social-psychological rewards (such as social associations and status perception).  He formalized the
possible effects of increased monetary rewards.  In particular, he discussed the situation when one agent
is jealous of another’s rewards (which he called jalt), such as when some people are paid and others not.
• Lerner and Tirole (2002) drew on labor economics when they analyzed the economics of OSS and
concluded that OSS contributors could be directly rewarded though employment or rewarded by signaling
and subsequently gaining employment.
• Roberts et al. (2006) found that paid participation lead to above-average contribution levels.  In addition,
they found that being paid to contribute was positively related to developers’ status motivations but
negatively related to their use-value motivations.  No evidence of diminished intrinsic motivation in the
presence of extrinsic motivations was found.
License
restriction
License restriction is usually thought to limit the commercial exploitation of the source code, i.e., the option to
combine OSS with proprietary software for sale.
Key empirical findings:
• Fershtman and Gandal (2007) found that output per contributor is much higher when licenses are less
restrictive and that the number of contributors is higher when licenses are restrictive.
• Lerner and Tirole (2002) described changes toward less restrictive OSS licenses that opened up for
bundling OSS with proprietary software.  They discussed the firm advantages of releasing existing
proprietary code.
• Osterloh and Rota (2007) claimed that OSS can flourish even after the advent of a dominant design, when
knowledge sharing is no longer supported by great learning potential, low opportunity costs, and selective
benefits.  They argued that this is because OSS is better at solving first- and second-order social
dilemmas where OSS licenses hinder the exploitation of voluntary donors.
• Stewart et al. (2006) found that community sponsorship and licensing address complementary developer
motivations, so that the influence of licensing on development activity depends on the kind of
organizational sponsor a project has.  For example, “the presence of a non-market sponsor may alleviate
concerns as to the project’s future in the same way as a restrictive license would, in the sense that the
restrictive license is not perceived as necessary to protect the developers’ interests” (2006, p. 141).  In
addition, OSS projects that use a nonrestrictive license will attract greater user interest over time than
those that use a restrictive license.
Social and
technical
exposure 
to the
community
Refers to effects from exposure that, over time, create opportunities for advancement and work on more
challenging tasks that require deep insights into the community’s workings.
Key empirical findings:
• Rullani (2007) concluded that exposure to a community increases developers’ contributions independently
of their predetermined preferences.  
• Shah (2006) maintained that the developers’ long-term accumulation of knowledge provided opportunities
to engage in more challenging tasks, or tasks that require broader knowledge of the code base (multiple
modules and components).  
• Spaeth et al. (2008) found that contributions impacted on developers’ positioning in the community, which
in turn provided some developers with private benefits, such as reputation gain, influence of the technical
agenda, and learning opportunities.
• von Krogh et al. (2003) found that newcomers who wanted to get their work accepted by established
developers and to be able to exert influence on the technical design in the project, have to adhere to
behavioral scripts for joining the community.
658 MIS Quarterly Vol. 36 No. 2/June 2012
von Krogh et al./Motivation and Social Practice in OSS Development
report that their work is guided by strong ideologies (which
may be expressions of ethics), such as writing software that
should be free for all to download and use.  A review and
framework of motivations in the context of the OSS develop-
ment phenomenon, therefore, needs a theoretical foundation
that allows such ethical and ideological issues to be
addressed.
Further, MacIntyre is concerned with the implications of so-
called “incommensurable moral premises” rather than ap-
proaches to reach a consensus on values, norms, and decisions
often found in conventional (analytical) moral philosophy
(e.g., Habermas (1988) on rational dialogue and communi-
cative action; see Mingers and Walsham (2010) for an appli-
cation to IS).  The theory is based on the assumption that
people from different cultures, practices, and institutions may
“subscribe” to various ethics and thus may also argue from
different moral premises that would be impractical or impos-
sible to reconcile.  Incommensurable moral premises are
relevant for understanding motivation in OSS development,
too.  While commercial firms provide pecuniary and career
incentives to motivate developers, many (but not all) OSS
developers work for free (Lakhani and Wolf 2005).
According to field accounts, some developers even find it
“immoral” to work for a commercial software company
(Stallman 1999).
Trying to change developers’ moral premises may be difficult
and impractical.  Firm participation in OSS development and
gated communities (Roberts et al. 2006; Shah 2006) raises the
question of implications for developers’ motivation, given the
coexistence and interaction of institutions and social practices
that build on different moral premises.  People who join a
social practice gradually adopt shared values and strive for
standards of excellence defined within it (MacIntyre 1981).
Thus, the analysis of moral premises in a social practice is
essential in order to understand what motivates people to
perform and improve a craft.  As Feller and Fitzgerald (2002)
argue, software development is a craft that has evolved its
own professional standards, which constitute the context in
which software development is done.  It is reasonable to
assume that, in contemporary software development, people
are differently motivated and conduct their work based on
vastly different (perhaps incommensurable) moral premises. 
An analysis of motivation in this context thus needs a frame-
work that can capture these moral premises.
There are three concepts from MacIntyre’s theory that are
central to our analysis:  social practice, goods, and institu-
tions.  Human activity is a holistic expression of the narrative
of a human life embedded in some social traditions that give
rise to social practices and the pursuit of quality.  MacIntyre
defines a (social) practice as 
any coherent and complex form of socially estab-
lished cooperative human activity through which
goods internal to that form of activity are realized in
the course of trying to achieve those standards of ex-
cellence which are appropriate to, and partly defini-
tive of, that form of activity, with the result that
human powers to achieve excellence, and human
conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are
systematically extended (MacIntyre 1981, p. 187).
This definition can be applied to a range of professions and
crafts, such as architecture, medicine, journalism, science, and
the arts, with the precondition that a social practice should
have wide and positive effects for humankind.6
Because of its ubiquitous presence and the wide-ranging
impact of IS in all aspects of contemporary human life,
software development, like many other areas of engineering
and technology (Latour 1996; van der Burg and van Gorp
2005), should be considered a social practice in MacIntyre’s
sense of the concept.  Scacchi (2002), though, has written
about the differences between traditional software engineering
and OSS development practices (see also Rolandsson et al.
2011).  He notes that 
[OSS developers] enact teamwork structures and
relatively flat, peer-oriented, decentralized com-
munity forms that reduce/supplant functional organi-
zational forms inherent in traditional [software
engineering] techniques that increased bureaucratic
tendencies.  [OSS] avoids reliance on formal project
management techniques and administrative struc-
tures that pervade industrial [software engineering]
projects (p. 3).
6A social practice is the basis for making decisions about which virtues are
called for in particular circumstances and the best way of enacting them
(Fowers 2003; Noel 1999; Rämö 2004).  Dunne (1992) refers to “ethical
knowledge” that directs “ethical action.”  Aristotle’s discussion of the “good”
refers to man’s practice “of his soul’s faculties in conformity with excellence
or virtue” (McKeon 1941, p. 33).  The good becomes a metaphysical goal,
like truth, justice, and beauty, toward which people strive by adjusting their
life and actions.  However, in a modern world “good” may be contested by
people who pursue different goals.  The very standards that define what is
good may be subject to different interests and, therefore, judgment itself will
be judged as more or less virtuous (whether something is judged good or bad,
right or wrong).  MacIntyre argues we should rather understand the common
good as internal to a social practice, as a goal to be achieved by its prac-
titioners (Knight 1998).
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Moreover, the social practice is intertwined with the technical
object (see the discussion in Orlikowski and Scott 2008).
MacKenzie (2005) suggests that the OSS code itself, with
modular, functional, and transparent objects, gives rise to a
social practice with its own ethics.  The technical object of the
software code requires developers to behave in a specific way
when creating and maintaining it, for example, modularizing,
reusing, keeping to the API specification, or taking great care
to document (Baldwin and Clark 2006).  Thus, “to be an OSS
developer” means to engage in a social practice and to adhere
to its specific rules of conduct, because these are believed to
enable the creation of a high-quality product for its users (von
Hippel 2001; von Krogh and von Hippel 2006).  At the same
time, according to Scacchi, it also means abandoning other
rules related to institutions of software engineering prevalent
in industry.
When individuals act, MacIntyre’s theory proposes that social
practices together with institutions create two types of good:
external and internal.  External goods (external to the social
practice) include capital, status, or power, which are the
property of individuals and/or institutions.  Internal goods are
defined by the social practice and are public goods that
benefit all participants in the social practice and the wider
community.  This is why, as noted above, MacIntyre (1981)
chooses to speak of a social practice in relation to collective
activity that produces wide-ranging positive effects for
humankind.  The difference between external and internal
goods can be exemplified in the case of science.  Scientific
knowledge can be considered an internal good of science, of
benefit to the scientific community and humanity at large.
The creation of scientific knowledge adheres to the highest
methodological standards set by the scientific community.
The status and salary bestowed on individual scientists, and
the power that follows from their expertise, are the external
goods of science.  However, there is no short cut to obtain
these external rewards, which illustrates the importance of
practice-based virtues of practitioners extending beyond their
personal preferences.  One first needs to work hard on devel-
oping the skills necessary for being a good scientist (as an
unpaid student, for example) in the view of the scientific
community, before personal economic benefits can be
realized.  Analogously, internal and external goods exist in
OSS development.  Internal goods are, for instance, the
resulting software code, which—under an appropriate
license—has public good characteristics.  Additional internal
goods to the practice are the joy of collaborating with similar-
minded peers and the spreading of quality software, em-
powering software users.  Given the wide range of devel-
opers’ skills, the code quality nevertheless varies across
projects.  Individual reputation, the opportunity for developers
to signal their value to potential employers through their code,
and the solution to one’s private technical problems are
external goods that are accessible by one individual.
MacIntyre’s theory emanates from a criticism of Aristotle’s
work on ethics and virtues in political leadership.  He notes
that practitioners achieve excellence of character or virtue in
pursuing internal goods.  To act in a virtuous manner is to
emulate the rules of morality rather than simply abiding by
them because one is in one way or another commanded to do
so.  A social practice, therefore, is a “school of virtue,” where
practitioners learn aspects of the internal good, such as ethical
reasoning, argumentation, criteria for excellence and product
quality, rules of communication, and so forth.  Justice, cour-
age, truthfulness, and, above all, love for the social practice,
are cultivated through practitioners’ participation.  Practi-
tioners discover and commit to goals that lie beyond their own
selfish, short-term needs and desires.  They realize that they
can only achieve the internal goods that are of value to
themselves, their social practice, and wider society when they
emulate the standards of excellence already established within
the practice.  Pursuing internal goods (excellence) is synony-
mous with cultivating virtues by subordinating oneself and
one’s relations with others to the reasoning that is internal to
the social practice.7
As Feldman and Orlikowski (2011, p. 11) argue, “in focusing
on practice theory, we understand the mutually constitutive
ways in which agency is shaped by but also produces,
reinforces, and changes its structural conditions.”  We refer to
these structural conditions, which include organizations (e.g.,
hierarchy, community), rules (e.g., coordination), and rou-
tines, as institutions.  More specifically, in MacIntyre’s theory
institutions are “characteristically and necessarily concerned
with [the provision of] external goods” (1981, p. 194), and
can be understood as sustainable forms of human cooperation,
governed by these organizations, rules, and routines, which
exist beyond the presence and efforts of each individual.
Thus, medicine, chess, and software development are
7For there to be an identifiable common and internal good, MacIntyre (1994,
p. 35) suggests that  “there must be identifiable structures of community, so
that one can understand how the parts which different individuals contribute
are contributing to a common goal.”  However, as Blackledge (2009, p. 870)
argues in his analysis of MacIntyre and social practices,“It is…only in small-
scale communities that politics can escape from the compartmentalization that
is endemic in the modern world.”  MacIntyre believes that it is this compart-
mentalization that hinders the “flourishing of local communities” (1998b, p.
248) and that it is only in local communities that “cooperation as a common
good” (1999, p. 114) can emerge spontaneously.  However, the Internet
allows even large global communities with hundreds of developers and users
to follow each other’s work, making Blackledge’s insistence on “local” less
relevant for analyzing OSS development.
660 MIS Quarterly Vol. 36 No. 2/June 2012
von Krogh et al./Motivation and Social Practice in OSS Development
examples of social practices, whereas a hospital, a chess club,
or a software firm are institutions.
Institutions such as governments, NGOs, and firms are a
prerequisite for the organization and sustenance of social
practices.  In the words of Beadle and Moore (2006), “insti-
tutions house the social practice.”  A social practice cannot
exist and be sustained without the supporting structures that
provide rules for human cooperation.  The relationship be-
tween institutions and social practices is so intimate that they
form a single causal order in which the ideals and
the creativity of the practice are always vulnerable to
the acquisitiveness of the institution, in which the
cooperative care for common goods of the practice
is always vulnerable to the competitiveness of the
institution” (MacIntyre 1981, p. 194).
At the same time as institutions enable social practices to
produce internal goods, they distribute external goods in the
form of power, status, and financial rewards.  Thus, internal
goods and external goods are always produced concurrently,
giving rise to unavoidable tensions between social practices
and institutions to be discussed below.  To summarize, the
conceptual building blocks discussed here form a dynamic
and mutually dependent complex that helps us to understand
aspects of human behavior in general and cooperative
behavior, such as OSS development, in particular.
MacIntyre’s Critique of Firms and Managers
MacIntyre’s theory has been used in organization studies
(e.g., Beadle and Moore 2006) but, as Dawson and Barthol-
omew (2003) note, applying it is not unproblematic since
MacIntyre criticizes heavily contemporary notions of manage-
ment and firms as institutions.  While this concern must be
taken seriously, we will show that the strength of the concep-
tual building blocks is precisely that they derive explanatory
power from highlighting distinct differences between social
practices and institutions.
Whereas institutions provide practitioners with external goods
that satisfy their need for compensation, they may also corrupt
or fail to support social practices by overshadowing or con-
flicting with motives to develop a craft to adhere to the social
practice’s ethics.  Inevitably, much of MacIntyre’s (1981)
critique of institutions is directed at management.  However,
Moore (2008) points out that this critique is part of a general
critique of modernity; we live in an emotivist culture in which
moral choices and actions are expressions of people’s prefer-
ences and emotional states.  In MacIntyre’s highly contro-
versial view, managers’ preferences are to seek external
goods as ends, using other individuals as means.  They justify
their power and monetary compensation by implementing
techniques and systems for social change.  However, because
of the complexity of organizations, techniques and systems
seldom lead to predictable outcomes in terms of enhancing
effectiveness or efficiency, and so he claims the basis for
justification must be false.  Furthermore, the implementation
of planned social change can do more harm than good to a
social practice’s capacity for producing internal goods.  This
critique echoes Robey and Markus’s (1984) much-cited
analysis of the unpredictable outcomes of the design of
management information systems (MIS).  Moreover, because
managers are often influenced by monetary rewards and seek
to create and appropriate excessive external goods, their
actions may undermine practitioners’ motivations to improve
their social practice, and ultimately destroy its social fabric,
including relationships between practitioners.8
Analyzing the “morality of management,” Moore attempts to
find a solution to this conundrum.  In his view, the business
organization is a social practice–institution combination
where the presence of virtuous agents at both levels may
result in a “virtuous business organization.”  The manager
partakes in both the “core” social practice of, for example,
software development and the social practice geared at
building and changing institutions (e.g., running a software
firm).  MacIntyre repeatedly warns that because institutional
goals may conflict with the internal goods of a social practice,
institutions may constrain or corrupt social practices and de-
motivate or demoralize practitioners.  This is the case when
institutions pursue limited goals aimed at external goods (e.g.,
excessive profits and competition) at the expense of internal
goods that motivate practitioners toward the goals of im-
proving the social practice, such as achieving excellence in a
craft (making money on watches is not the same as perfecting
the skills of watchmaking).  One strength of MacIntyre’s
work is to highlight such distinct differences between social
practices and institutions.  The role of virtue ethics also be-
8MacIntyre (1998a) also raises doubts that management can be considered a
social practice because this presumes attention to the creation of internal
goods and the well-being of humanity.  Managers’ concerns are with tech-
niques and systems for transforming raw materials into products, unskilled
labor into skilled labor, and investment into profit (p. 30).  Managers decide
and act to achieve a desired end state through social change, but are blind to
other concerns, such as the wider effect of their actions on humanity.  Thus,
MacIntyre concludes they are not able to engage in moral debates about their
own actions.  MacIntyre’s harsh critique is unwarranted.  It neglects the very
fact that managers are mostly concerned with the consequences of their
actions and repeatedly engage in a wider discourse with society about the
nature of their activities and the purpose of the institutions they run.  A
similar point is made by Dawson and Bartholomew (2003).
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comes clear:  Without virtues, such as justice, care, courage,
and truthfulness, social practices could not resist what he calls
the “corrupting power” of institutions (MacIntyre 1981, p.
194).
Critique and Exegesis
We believe there are great merits to MacIntyre’s theory when
analyzing human motivation in relation to social practices and
institutions.  Yet, his writings have received fundamental
criticism, which we will discuss briefly here.  The following
section thus completes our review of MacIntyre’s theory with
a critique and exegesis.  This critical interpretation aims to
uncover the significance of the theory for OSS development,
and in particular how it informs the three questions we posed
in the “Introduction.”
First, MacIntyre has been criticized for his claim that habitual
patterns of behavior associated with ethical values can no
longer be found in contemporary society in the way that
Aristotle conceived of them in his idea of polis (Bender
1998).  MacIntyre gives too much credit to an historical
account of virtues, and how they can be achieved by indi-
viduals seeking to obtain “unity of life.”  In so doing, he takes
an overly optimistic view of what social practices, and the
people within them, can achieve in terms of striving for excel-
lence.  Yet writers on OSS remind us that there are strong
ethical values at work in the community of developers
(Stallman 1999; Zeitlyn 2003).  For example, people who are
suspected of unlawfully commercializing the software, or of
introducing code from a commercial environment, are likely
to be “flamed” through verbal attacks and have their privi-
leges (such as access to the formal version of the source code)
revoked, because this behavior is not considered consistent
with being an OSS developer (Shah 2006). MacIntyre’s
theory links human behavior and standards of excellence
within the social practice to outputs in the form of internal
goods.  One main concern for the software industry in
general, and OSS in particular, is the output of high-quality
software (see Aberdour 2007; Gillies 1992; Kan 2002), which
is captured by Question 1:  Why do OSS developers produce
high-quality software when they do?
Second, Macintyre speaks broadly and confidently about
managers and firms without seeming to care much about the
details of what they do and how they work.  While he takes a
negative view of institutions (e.g., firms), at the same time he
acknowledges “no practices could survive for any length of
time unsustained by institutions” (MacIntyre 1981, p. 194).
MacIntyre’s critique of institutions, in particular firms, is
rooted in an overly critical view of modern society.  Claiming
that firms universally demoralize practitioners, who otherwise
seek to do good for their craft and social practice, is naïve and
does not take into account the variety of motivations and
institutions in existence (see also Brewer 1997).  Instead, it is
more fruitful to point to the risk that institutions may destroy
social practices.  For MacIntyre, managers act on behalf of
institutions and are primarily concerned with increasing
external goods.  Yet, the pursuit of external goods clearly
does not preclude some kind of balance between internal and
external goods (Halliday and Johnsson 2010).  In our reading,
MacIntyre is overly pessimistic about management’s ability
to achieve this balance.  As we mentioned above, one solution
to the problem is to understand managers as belonging to a
type of social practice geared at founding and changing
institutions (Moore 2008).  However, accepting this perspec-
tive risks omitting a potentially important inquiry into why
OSS developers (rather than managers) contribute to insti-
tutional change.  What is clear from MacIntyre’s analysis is
that institutions and social practices are mutually dependent
for the production of goods, and it follows that changes in
institutions may trigger changes in social practices and vice
versa.  The mechanisms by which this change functions, and
the role of OSS developers, remain unknown but the link
between institutions and social practice provides a theoretical
basis for approaching Question 2:  Why do OSS developers
change institutions?
Third, MacIntyre’s view of virtue ethics as related to social
practices and, more broadly, culture can be criticized from a
utilitarian view of moral philosophy.  Proponents of the latter
view would seek to find universal rules that can guide moral
behavior (Adams 1976; Cornman et al. 1982; Mill et al.
1987).  For example, one person will help another in distress
because helping is a universal rule that provides utility to the
person being helped and brings the helper a deep sense of
satisfaction.  MacInytre’s relativistic position neglects the
search for such universal rules.  In addition, from a utilitarian
perspective, the theory defines an ideal unity of life bound to
the social practice and the virtues it develops, but lacks
objective standards.  However, it would also be problematic
to ignore entirely that moral premise and actions in everyday
life may be shaped by the social context.  Indeed, OSS devel-
opment is a collective undertaking, whether in terms of reuse
of software code or adhering to collectively established rules
of conduct.  Thus, researchers may acknowledge the social
practice as the relevant context for OSS development and
study rules that might depart from universal rules (say, of the
Free Software movement or commercial software develop-
ment).  In studying OSS development as a heterogeneous
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phenomenon9 that contrasts with commercial software devel-
opment institutions (such as software firms and intellectual
property rules), MacIntyre’s theory offers a way to think
about motivation with a complementary set of assumptions
about how and why people act in a particular context (see the
next section).  This is particularly relevant because of the
long-term perspective on the end result of making a contri-
bution to OSS and the unclear rewards associated with
engaging in other practice-enhancing activities (see Shah
2006).  The shift in the conception of motivation as primarily
reward-oriented (as, for example, in self-determination
theory) to practice-oriented may guide research into
answering Question 3:  Why do developers sustain OSS
development?
Toward a New Research Framework
and Agenda
The research framework and agenda that we present in this
section grows out of the incomplete match between the nature
of OSS development and the theoretical underpinnings of
reviewed literature on motivation to contribute to OSS
development.  OSS development is characterized by signi-
ficant voluntary contributions, self-selection of tasks among
developers, clan- and self-control, community-type organiza-
tion, and strong ethical considerations.  Our review identified
the dominant role played by self-determination theory in
explaining developers’ contributions.  However, as we dis-
covered, self-determination theory cannot account for several
of the intricacies that characterize the OSS development
phenomenon.  As a result, the domination of the self-
determination perspective that runs through the existing
motivation literature may compromise our field’s ability to
adequately address the three research questions posed
initially.  There is no doubt that self-determination theory
does provide very valuable guidance and answers to many
important research questions.  However, a fundamentally
different and complementary approach is required to account
for gaps we identified; research on motivation in OSS
development neglected important aspects of the social prac-
tice as a context for motivation, including the ethics and
virtues that guide the work of engineers and software
developers (Friedman and Kahn 1994; Latour 1999; Martin
2000, 2002).  In short, people are moved to do many things,
but whether or not this is constituted by and for the social
practice of OSS development, is an entirely different matter.
In this section, we develop a theoretical framework to explain
how virtues and ethics—integral elements of a social
practice—influence developers’ motivations to contribute to
OSS.  Grounded in the conceptual building blocks discussed
in the previous section, we suggest an alternative and com-
plementary set of assumptions about the individual OSS
developer, as outlined in Table 3.  In particular we emphasize
a logic of unity of life.  Following this logic, individuals do
not necessarily act to achieve some immediate reward,
because they want to maximize use-value or gain favors
(compare this with the self-determination view).  Instead, they
act to achieve unity of life; they want to reach or maintain
consistency of action throughout their life—an ambition that
values personal development and contextual events and points
beyond the attainment of specific and immediate rewards. 
We use the metaphor of the journey to the end of the rainbow
to describe the idea of unity of life because a quest harbors
value in itself and can be questioned, interpreted, and
reconstructed self-referentially.  The journey might be con-
sidered worthwhile, exhausting, beautiful, pointless, fulfilling,
and many other things—but as a journey it follows a sequence
of events limited by the individual life experience and subject
to reflection, memory, and expectation.  In MacIntyre’s
(1981) terms, human lives possess narrative structures
because they are embedded in social practices.  It is from this
link that we draw our framework:  Individuals are motivated
because, through participatory exposure to social practices,
they learn what it makes sense to do; and, vice versa, by
reflecting on the unity of life they shape social practices.  This
interdependence lies at the core of MacIntyre’s (1998a) virtue
ethics as it allows for a characterization of the virtues in the
interplay of individual life and social practice.
Following this logic, OSS developers are motivated by a
consistent stream of actions that we call unity of life.  Here, it
is not the immediate and isolated outcome that matters (the
carrot), but how the individual subjectively holds outcomes
and actions to be consistent over time (the journey toward the
end of the rainbow).  We contrast the alternative set of
assumptions with the assumptions observed in the reviewed
literature.  The dominant role of self-determination theory
informs the logic of what we call the self-determination view.
The reviewed literature on OSS development motivation has
not accounted broadly for the insight that social practices
strongly relate to people’s motivation (Morgeson and
Humphrey 2006).  As a response, we suggest a social practice
view of OSS development, where individuals take a long-
term, frequently developmental rather than situational per-
9There can be major differences, factions, and guilds among OSS developers. 
As one reviewer helpfully pointed out, there is an “XML guild,” for example. 
Developers often campaign for the “right and best” text editor, programming
language, or software license.
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Table 3.  Assumptions About the Individual OSS Developer
Self-determination View Social Practice View
Output Product Good
Incentive Reward Unity of life, moral obligation
Interaction with peers and tasks Situational, next step, solution-oriented Developmental, sequential, quest-oriented
Quality perception Use-value Standards of excellence
Time perspective Short- to mid-term Long-term, sense for the right time
spective on social interaction, and pay attention to the
importance an activity assumes for unity of life.  Living well,
in the Aristotelian sense, aims at the right timing of actions,
attention to particulars, and aesthetic values (MacIntyre 1981;
Nussbaum 1985).  The individual views actions, outcomes,
and interactions through a “temporal lens” in order to achieve
a sequence of events that supports a life well lived.  A good
life refers to a moral position that results from the accumu-
lation of individual perception and more general principles
(Nussbaum 1985, p.  524).  The general principles (standards
of excellence are of particular interest here) are shared by
members of the social practice, and, following MacIntyre, the
individual gradually adapts standards of excellence developed
in the social practice, changing the institution to become
supportive rather than constraining, and producing a “good”
in terms of these standards, rather than a product measured in,
for example, features or hours spent working.  To be clear, a
good can only result from work, effort, and activities carried
out in a social practice.  Goods are collective in production
even when only one person carries out coding activities,
because coding follows standards of excellence that are
defined by the collective (i.e., the social practice).  In a social
practice view, the individual’s ideas of quality extend beyond
use-value—the value for users in resolving their own tech-
nical problem—to account for what the social practice values
and defines as the current state of the art.
To become an OSS developer means to acquire an identity
related to a social practice.  This means, contrary to the self-
determination view, that an individual does not become an
OSS developer simply by submitting code to a software
repository.  Martin (2002, p. 556) suggests:
These (social) practices enter centrally into defining
a way of life, with technological development
entering even more centrally into the ways of life of
engineers.  (The technologies are parts of or aspects
of ways of life.)
Identification instills a sense of moral obligation in individ-
uals to support and further develop the social practice.  For
example, a “moral obligation” in OSS is the early release of
software patches to the public, an integral part of the social
practice of OSS development (Raymond 1999).
Personal commitment goes beyond commitment to the soft-
ware product or external goods like profit but extends to the
social practice and its broader social effects.  From this
perspective, OSS development embedded in a social practice
becomes meaningful and a way of life with its own pleasure,
challenges, and other benefits.  Several authors have sug-
gested that self-reflection helps shape practitioners’ character
(Flyvbjerg 2001; Habermas 1988; MacIntyre 1981).  Once
developers contribute to the social practice, are motivated by
it, and reflect on their actions (Calhoun 1983), they also gain
insights about their values in relation to that social practice,
for example, whether or not the virtues it values fit their own
personal virtues.
An orientation toward a sequence of tasks mirrors
MacIntyre’s idea about the individual’s search for a narrative
structure in life, which means that the sum and choice of our
activities form a consistent story of our life or the role we see
ourselves fulfilling.  This can mean that a developer follows
a quest that extends beyond the next step in a workflow or the
solution to a specific task and accepts high goal ambiguity. 
Individuals are important actors who participate in building
institutions that structure and govern the social practice
(Geiger 2009; Whittington 2006) and whose motivations
range widely from seeking autonomy, freedom from conven-
tions, creativity, to the wish to change their world (Ketchen et
al. 2007; Rindova et al. 2009).10
In the social practice view, motivation can be directed at the
good—which includes software code produced following
standards of excellence defined by the social practice—or at
institutional change aimed at supporting the social practice.
In either case it is not directly (short-term) reward-oriented
but induced through the social practice.  Hence, motivation in
10Many authors on entrepreneurship therefore understand motivation and
social practice as inseparable (Steyaert 2007, p. 467; see also Schatzki 2005).
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the social practice view differs from motivation in the self-
determination view.  According to the social practice view,
motivation is intimately linked with a developer’s experience
of being a member of the social practice of OSS.  One
important result of this is that if people sense that the social
practices they value have become corrupted in some way, for
example by institutional goals, they often seek to change
institutions.
These two views of motivation are complementary in the
study of OSS development.  Starting with the premise that the
social practice view accounts for at least some individuals’
behavior, the framework’s theoretical conjectures can be used
to formulate concrete propositions about OSS development
and contribute to an agenda for future work.  We begin the
next section by illustrating this with an account of the
emergence of the Free Software Foundation.
On the Emergence of an Institution
In the 1960s and 1970s, much software development was
carried out by scientists and engineers in academic and
corporate research laboratories.  It was a normal part of
developers’ social practice to give and exchange software
they had written, in order to modify and build upon each
other’s software, both individually and collectively, and in
turn to make their modifications freely available.  Virtues
such as the openness to sharing knowledge actively and
intensely were considered important for learning, efficient
code development, better bug-free products, and, overall, the
development of the software engineering profession.
The emphasis on the virtues of sharing work in software
development was very strong among a group of developers at
MIT’s Artificial Intelligence Laboratory during this period
(Levy 1984).  The first conflicts between the institutional
goals and the virtues of individuals valued by the social
practice can be traced back to the 1980s.  At this time, MIT
decided to license some of the code created by this group to
a commercial firm.  In accordance with its commercial
interests (external goods), the firm restricted access to the
source code for that software to exclude the original MIT
developers, creating a great deal of frustration and irritation
among them.  This incident is a good illustration of the kind
of conflicts to which MacIntyre draws our attention.  Whereas
software developers at the time considered virtues such as
openness, learning, and knowledge-sharing a prerequisite for
the social practice’s creation of internal goods (including
product excellence, professional development, and benefits
for others), they felt institutional concerns for the constraint
of external goods, which they feared would eventually harm
the practice.  Richard Stallman, at the time a programmer at
MIT’s Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, was distressed by
the institutional pressure to restrict access to source code and
sell software through licensing.  He believed it would harm
the software engineering profession and hinder “humanity’s
rapidly growing need for better and better technologies.”
Stallman viewed these practices as “morally wrong” impinge-
ments upon the rights of software users to learn and create
freely.  In his own words, faced with the collapse of his
community’s social practice, he had to make “a stark moral
choice” (Stallman 1999, p. 19):
With my community gone, to continue as before was
impossible.…The easy choice was to join the
proprietary software world, signing non-disclosure
agreements and promising not to help my fellow
hackers.  Most likely I would also be developing
software that was released under a non-disclosure
agreement, thus adding to the pressure on other
people to betray their fellows too.  I could have
made money this way, and perhaps amused myself
writing code.  But I knew at the end of my career, I
would look back on years of building walls to divide
people, and I feel I had spent my life making the
world a worse place....So I looked for a way a
programmer could do something for the good.  I
asked myself, was there a program or programs I
could write so as to make the community possible
again?
Stallman’s response to this challenge was to create an institu-
tion as an alternative to the firm, called the Free Software
Foundation.  The purpose of the foundation was to preserve
free access to software developed by people who shared the
virtues valued by the social practice.  The legal mechanism he
developed to support this idea was the GNU General Public
License, which can be affixed to a piece of software by a
developer, and which guarantees a number of basic rights to
all future developers and users.  These include the right to
download for free, study, and modify the source code, and the
right to redistribute to others modified or unmodified versions
of the software for free.  Stallman firmly believed that this
license and the new institution of the Free Software Foun-
dation would support the social practice of software develop-
ment and eventually help create excellent products of benefit
to society.  His institutional alternative was created to
preserve the social practice’s capacity to create internal goods
alongside external goods pursued by the software industry.
Later observers refer to Stallman’s institutional alternative as
a “free software” ideology that motivates developers to join
and contribute to OSS (Stewart and Gosain 2006).  However,
the origin of this collective action was the social practice of
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software development that motivated Stallman to create an
institution.  To paraphrase an insight from MacIntyre’s
theory, anything that does not promote the public good, such
as the appropriation of collectively developed software code,
may not be properly regarded as social practice.
An internal good can be a practitioner’s pursuit of excellence
in software development; it is against this backdrop we should
understand Stallman’s moves.  Thus, the new institution of
free software sprang out of practitioners’ moral considera-
tions, and these motives are shaped by the social practice of
software development.  Rather than ascribing to the view that
the new institution originates in an overarching ideology that
motivates people to act, we conclude that the concern for
product quality, work, and the wider implications of Free and
Open Source software gives rise to new institutions.  This
conclusion differs from other accounts of OSS, like Moody’s
Rebel Code (2001), or social movements that confront the
establishment of the software industry on ideological grounds
(see the discussion of ideology and collective action in von
Hippel and von Krogh 2003; Stewart and Gosain 2006).
Finally, consistent with the theory we develop, if the insti-
tutions of free and open source software fail to support social
practices that create internal and external goods and enable
developers’ pursuit of excellence or unity of life, institutional
alternatives will emerge that do the job better.
A Social Practice View on Motivation in OSS
Development and Issues for IS Research
In the previous two sections we discussed, first, an alternative
set of assumptions about individual OSS developers and,
second, how the emergence of new institutions are linked to
values central to the social practice of OSS development. 
Based on this, we now develop a framework that links
MacIntyre’s conceptual building blocks with motivation.  In
this motivation–practice framework, we consider OSS devel-
opment the social practice under investigation.  Thus, the
motivation to contribute to OSS development can be
rephrased as the motivation to contribute to the social practice
of OSS development.  However, in the MacIntyrian per-
spective adopted here, it is not meaningful to think of a social
practice absent from institutions and goods.  Strictly, a social
practice cannot exist without producing internal goods; and it
cannot exist without supporting institutions that protect its
standards of excellence and enable the creation of external
goods.  Such is the nature of the social practice.  Rather, a
separation of the social practice from institutions and goods
can only be made for purely analytical reasons, a fact we shall
profit from when theorizing from our conceptual building
blocks.
We postulate that individual-level motivation to act is directly
related to either active participation in the social practice or
through attempts to change the supporting institutions of the
social practice.  Thus, goods (as outcomes and rewards) are
not directly impacted by motivation.  Rather, the individual is
moved by and through the social practice to contribute to the
good or to change the institutions that support the social
practice.  Figure 1 depicts these relationships and shows three
theoretical conjectures discussed in detail below.  In its most
basic form, the framework illustrates that researchers should
not implicitly assume a single unidirectional link between
motivation, action, and reward.  Thus, using the framework,
researchers can ask questions previously not considered to
belong to the domain of motivation.
The integration of motivation with MacIntyre’s conceptual
building blocks creates relationships that suggest answers to
the three questions stated at the outset of the paper, in the
form of theoretical conjectures and concrete propositions. 
Each of the three questions corresponds to one of the
relationships in the framework (numbered in Figure 1).  Next,
we discuss corresponding conjectures and propositions as
well as issues for future research.
Theoretical Conjecture One
Question 1:  How and why do OSS developers pro-
duce high-quality software (goods) when they do?
Theoretical Conjecture 1:  OSS developers con-
tribute to the production of internal goods (e.g. 
high-quality software) when their actions follow the
standards of excellence of the social practice.  At the
same time, the internal good produced by the social
practice impacts on standards of excellence pursued
in the social practice.
Proposition 1:  Developers in a social practice
create a sense of timing and developmental inter-
actions with peers that improves the social practice.
Proposition 2:  The software product impacts on the
standards of excellence in OSS development. 
First, quality is an essential element in understanding social
practices because its members learn, internalize, and even-
tually improve the standards of excellence.  Developers need
to acquire an understanding and appreciation of quality by
participating (for some time) in the social practice.  In the
framework, quality is not globally assessed or measured but
is understood as internal to the social practice: it is defined as
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Figure 1.  Relationships Between Motivation and Social Practice, Institution, and Goods
a characteristic of internal goods that adhere to the standards
of excellence in the social practice.  Revisiting the assump-
tions about the individual developer, Proposition 1 fits with
the observation that participation in a social practice requires
engagement with the practice’s goals, a developmental under-
standing of social relations within the practice that leads to a
broader set of activities (e.g., including helping behavior; see
Lakhani and von Hippel 2003), and an appreciation of incen-
tives (their timing and moral and aesthetic value) beyond the
immediate rewards of an activity.  This is why OSS devel-
opers devote considerable effort to making code “beautiful,”
helping other developers to understand and appreciate the
nature of “beautiful code,” or releasing a new version of
software at symbolic points in time.  One OSS project, for
example, chooses release version numbers that asymptotically
approximate the number π.
In addition, Proposition 2 fits with the observation that OSS
developers often receive immediate user feedback on
installing, systems compatibility, bugs, license restrictions,
etc. (Francalanci and Merlo 2008; Lee and Cole 2003).  When
developers see how the software product performs on their
own and other users’ computers, or compares in efficiency
with competing products, they may choose to maintain or
adjust the standards of excellence in the social practice, as
part of learning to practice better.  In OSS development,
software users often communicate directly with software
developers, exemplifying their intent with code patches.  The
issue tracker of the Firefox web browser, for example, is filled
with feature requests that are often accompanied with source
code patches implementing these.
The theoretical conjecture also entails a research agenda:
What activities are considered good (e.g., code production,
training of other developers, improving governance structures,
or communication tools)?  Collective work also involves
mundane tasks that, nevertheless, are taken up voluntarily if
need be (Shah 2006).  In our perspective, what needs to be
done to achieve quality is determined collectively by indi-
viduals who “hold one another accountable to what is at issue
and at stake in ongoing practices” (Rouse 2007, p. 54).  Yet,
by which other mechanisms are quality standards collectively
determined?  Furthermore, what does the perception of
quality, informed by standards of excellence, mean for firm–
community collaboration?  What are the sources of hetero-
geneity in standards of excellence across OSS communities?
These two questions are related because individual contrib-
utors (such as the representative of a software firm) help
define standards of excellence in their respective com-
munities.  In turn, the quality standards in an OSS community
might have repercussions within firms that participate in
collective development.  The extent to which these repercus-
sions lead to conflict or to fruitful interaction between firms
and communities is largely unexplored.
Theoretical Conjecture Two
Question 2:  Why do OSS developers change
institutions?
Theoretical Conjecture 2:  OSS developers change
institutions when and where these institutions no
longer protect sufficiently the standards of excel-
lence of the social practice.  In addition, institutions
are changed in order to provide external goods that
support the social practice.
Proposition 3:  Institutions that offer external goods
to OSS developers (such as firms participating in
OSS and hiring developers) are judged as supportive
or constraining by the developers according to the
institutions’ adherence to the standards of excel-
lence defined in the social practice.
Proposition 4:  Under certain conditions, developers
of OSS are prepared to sacrifice potential rewards
(external goods offered by a current institution) in
Social Practice
Institution
Internal Good
External Good
Motivation
3 1
2 2
#
Conjectures
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order to make an institution compatible with the
standards of excellence defined by the social prac-
tice of OSS.
Second, motivation may trigger institutional change.  The
earlier example of Richard Stallman founding the Free
Software Foundation illustrated a form of motivation geared
not at immediate rewards but at the protection of a social
practice that achieves internal good.  This can be labeled
ethical or ideological and makes perfect sense when viewed
from the perspective of the social practice.  Institutional
change was necessary to protect the social practice from
extinction, given that newly formed software companies hired
away Stallman’s community of peers and threatened to
change radically the way software was developed.  The
changes Stallman and his peers implemented in the way soft-
ware could be licensed represented an institutional change. 
The license regime regulates the exchange of software among
developers.  The exchange is part of the social practice and
free exchange is considered good practice in OSS devel-
opment.  MacInytre focuses on virtues that extend beyond the
short-term interests of individuals giving social practices an
enduring character worthy of analysis in their own rights (see
also Halliday and Johnsson 2010).  In brief, we propose that
these enduring characteristics of the social practice give rise
to institutional change via the motivation of developers.
When institutions, such as firms, cannot sustain social
practices sought by virtuous software developers, the latter
will seek to change or develop new institutions that serve
better the internal goods of the social practice.  Proposition 3
builds on the argument that practitioners will judge insti-
tutions by their adherence to the standards of excellence of the
social practice because a firm, for example, that contributes to
OSS development engages in the social practice and offers
external goods (such as salaries and career opportunities).  As
an output of institutions, external goods need to enable
standards of excellence of the social practice that the insti-
tution supports.  This could mean that salaries or promotions
within the firm need to be perceived as fair according to the
standards of excellence in OSS development.
In the motivation–practice framework, institutions serve the
social practice and not the other way around.  The priority of
the social practice over institutions implies that individuals
will sacrifice potential rewards offered by an institution (such
as a firm hiring OSS developers and offering a salary) in favor
of adhering to standards of excellence, as Proposition 4 states.
Thus, the “good and right thing to do,” according to the social
practice’s standards of excellence, may be to change the insti-
tution and risk losing external goods in favor of internal goods
if standards of excellence are threatened, as the example of
Stallman illustrates.  This could mean that a developer would
lobby for policy changes, implement corporate restructuring,
or leave a well-paid job in a software firm.
Scholars currently cannot explain when institutional change
is called for in more general and systematic terms, which
opens a number of related research questions.  For example:
How are conflicts between extrinsic motivation and moral
obligations resolved when current institutions impose a choice
between the two (as in Stallman’s case)?  Under what condi-
tions do the assumptions about motivation from the social
practice view hold and account for institutional change?  How
can organizations accommodate individuals prepared to
engage in institutional change in order to pursue standards of
excellence?  And related to this, how can organizations drive
institutional change with the motivation of developers?
Theoretical Conjecture Three
Question 3:  Why do developers sustain the social
practice of OSS development?
Theoretical Conjecture 3:  OSS developers sustain
the social practice of OSS development because
social practice instills the motivation to uphold its
standards of excellence over time.
Proposition 5:  The motivation to contribute be-
comes stronger during developers’ tenure in an OSS
community and by their contribution to the social
practice.
Proposition 6:  Through sustained contributions to
the social practice, developers become motivated to
contribute beyond code patches to educate and help
others, and take on tasks that support the internal
good of the social practice.
Third, how does a social practice influence motivation and
vice versa?  Perhaps surprisingly, this question does not
appear to be prominent in MacIntyre’s work.  Virtues are
transmitted to individuals through socialization and collective
work and exercised within social practices by individuals who
choose activities that appear right in their life.  They choose
to sustain practices that cultivate internal goods that match
their individual sense of the common good and the life they
wish to live.  Entry and exit represent the dynamics of these
individual choices.  Organizations continuously face the entry
and exit of individuals who choose freely how and where to
enact their profession.  It follows from our argument that
motivations change with the context of the social practice.  A
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first entry into a community by making a contribution to OSS
is motivated differently from a sustained contribution to the
same practice: Shah (2006) observes that mundane tasks tend
to be accomplished by long-term members of communities. 
This can be interpreted, in line with our Propositions 5 and 6,
as a growing understanding of the internal goods of the social
practice and a stronger motivation to sustain contributions.
Developers gradually develop an understanding and appre-
ciation of the larger needs of the practice and are motivated to
contribute to necessary tasks that might appear mundane to
the outside observer.  Tasks such as bug fixing, maintenance
of software, or helping new users are, however, essential for
the social practice to function and produce high-quality
software, perhaps understood even better by seasoned devel-
opers than newcomers.  A flourishing OSS community
succeeds in creating this understanding with its members and
in motivating them to see these activities as core to the
production of internal goods.
Future research should uncover more detail about mutual
influence.  The motivation to contribute to a social practice
may change in quality as well as in direction and open
questions relate to both possibilities.  For example, could a
loss of interest in the internal good and subsequent exit be
triggered by conflicts over incommensurable moral premises?
The emergence of a proprietary software industry, as wit-
nessed by Stallman, made him the architect of a new software
license that regulates the free exchange of software.  When do
competing views of what constitutes a good practice
jeopardize developers’ long-term motivation?  Under what
conditions does an initial interest grow or wane over time,
given exposure to the social practice, learning, social
interaction, moral premises, help received, or a sense of
reciprocity in contributions to OSS?
One individual’s mark on the social practice may turn its
course of action or significantly extend its standards of
excellence.  According to the definition we discussed above,
a social practice is coherent and complex, two characteristics
that might be explained by the content of the work and the
history of the internal discussions of developers about the
good it achieves.  However, the social practice depends on
individuals who carry it forward, understand its complex
history and possibly incoherent tendencies, and correct and
sustain the social practice going forward.  This is easier said
than done.  So far, research on OSS has not contributed much
to the understanding of individual motivation beyond the
contribution of code itself, which raises a number of future
research questions.  For example, why do individuals found
new or fork (split up) existing OSS communities?  Why do
we observe a wide heterogeneity of communities and
philosophies within OSS (Himanen 2001; Moody 2001)?
There are, for example, distinct differences in ideology and
values between pragmatic OSS enthusiasts and the Free
Software Foundation (Stewart and Gosain 2006).  The wealth
of licenses and approaches to similar problems calls for more
research on why individuals choose different paths and subtle
changes over the established wisdom found in some social
practice (developers are motivated to build institutions, not
only code).  Given the chance, OSS developers may diverge,
follow their own ideas, and realize similar if not identical
solutions in different ways.  Thus, what are the proper time
intervals to study motivation if one is to consider motivation
in which developers seek unity of life?  Another interesting
topic worth exploring is the differences between paid and
unpaid developers.  In the motivation–practice framework,
paid developers partly receive monetary compensation pro-
vided by institutions, whereas unpaid developers need to seek
other means of compensation.  Future research could, for
example, explore relationships between monetary compen-
sation and behavior within the social practice in order to
identify potential threats to the sustenance of the social prac-
tice, beyond the contributions of individual developers.
Finally, our review of motivation to contribute to OSS reveals
a bias toward assumptions originating in self-determination
theory, and prompts the development of a complimentary set
of assumptions that we associate with a social practice view,
building on the theory of MacIntyre.  The assumptions under-
lying the social practice view raise the empirical question of
the actual distribution of motivation types in a population. 
Future research may study the distribution of the two “ideal
types” of individual in a distribution of OSS developers.11
Conclusion
The objective of this paper is to provide a state-of-the-art
review of the study of motivation to contribute to OSS
development, and reinvigorate the research field by providing
a new theoretical framework with propositions.  We identify
a large body of work examining types of motivation that lead
developers to contribute their time and effort to the devel-
opment of OSS.  However, we argue that both the antecedents
and consequences of motivation are more extensive and
complex than the present level of theorizing and empirical
research has suggested. 
11Methodologically, this could be done analogously to the study of social
preferences in behavioral economics—for example, as Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) have done in their experimental studies to determine the distribution
of inequity-averse individuals in a population of students.
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OSS development differs from conventional software devel-
opment along three dimensions (incentives, control, and
coordination mechanisms), which in turn are reflective of a
distinct social practice in which ethics plays a central role. 
Because of these differences, we argued that individual
motivation should not be looked at in isolation.  Instead,
scholars should expand theory building and research to cover
the interplay with institutions, goods, and the social practice.
Following a trend to explore the role of social practices in the
IS field (Kellogg et al. 2006; Orlikowski 2000), and the social
sciences more generally (Schatzki 2005), we develop a theo-
retical framework around the conceptual building blocks of
social practice, institutions, and goods.  This new motivation–
practice framework is based on the theory of Alisdair
MacIntyre (1981, 1998a) and includes ethical considerations
of social practice.  The framework’s set of theoretical conjec-
tures and accompanying propositions provide answers to the
three questions identified in the beginning of the paper and
point to future research opportunities.
While the main contribution of the paper is the new
motivation–practice framework, we also (1) formulate impli-
cations for IS management, (2) discuss the relationship
between institutional change and social practice, and (3) tie
implications from the framework back to the self-
determination perspective in motivation studies.
Several implications for IS management can be extracted. 
First, standards of excellence emerging in global communities
of software developers can gain broad endorsement and
impact quality standards expected by users and customers.
For example, peer review and quick feedback loops in OSS
are said to lead to better quality.  Installing a culture of “doing
things properly,” rather than quickly hacking around bugs,
may ultimately result in better code quality.  Finally, estab-
lished tools developed for and within OSS can be employed
by any software development project.  Hence, close obser-
vation of the standards of excellence that characterize OSS
development may pay off also for software firms that do not
actively participate in OSS development.
Second, software developers collectively account for and
evolve the virtues in social practice.  MacIntyre (1981) refers
to the social practice as a “school of virtue,” because
individual learning is shaped by and informs the collective
appropriate conduct regarding ways of developing software.
Participating in OSS development could thus provide a
valuable training ground for software engineers, in so far as
the firm sees fit and is prepared to comply with the ethical
considerations in the social practice.  In this regard, the new
framework informs managers about the relationship between
OSS and proprietary software development.  OSS does not
necessarily exist in competition to proprietary software, but
rather complements it; it secures the social practices through
which certain standards of excellence in software devel-
opment can be further nurtured.  Software firms are actively
looking for developers who have “cut their teeth” in OSS
communities; firms such as Intel or Red Hat recruit
developers whose skills and standards of excellence stand out.
Third, as shown in the framework, incommensurable moral
premises may collide within a firm when developers adhere
to different traditions yet collaborate on the same projects.  In
a social practice perspective, one may identify and pre-
emptively solve looming conflicts over technology, standards,
rules, and routines in software firms.  However, the activity
of software development often builds on and refers to earlier
work and developers and the firms they represent may be held
accountable by other OSS developers for the work they
submit to OSS projects.  Questions of compatibility and
compliance with OSS development play an increasingly
important role for those firms that develop both proprietary
and open source software.
Fourth, a related issue is that the use of incentives and control
in software firms may need careful tailoring to fit with
developers’ motivations to contribute to OSS development. 
Monetary incentives are, of course, compatible with OSS
development (Roberts et al. 2006), but social practices can
instill loyalty and lead to motivation for institutional changes
that perhaps question the efficiency of such incentives. 
Fifth, developers can be motivated to change institutions in
order to support their practices.  This may apply to firms, too. 
For example, IBM founded the nonprofit Eclipse Foundation
as a neutral steward for technology that IBM had initially
developed, and created formal membership roles in which
IBM was only one among equals, in order to facilitate exter-
nal contributions of other firms and individuals.  Intel and
Oracle have founded institutions such as the Open Innovation
Network, which grants mutual licenses and a non-litigation
agreement for certain OSS technologies to all of its members.
The theoretical framework developed here also opens up a
new view on the relationship between institutional change and
social practices.  Other perspectives on the emergence of
institutions (for a review, see Hargrave and Van de Ven 2006)
argue convincingly that the struggle between factions and
social movements brings about change and institutional
innovation.  However, framing and political struggles may
capture neither the full diversity of people’s motivations to
contribute nor the role technology might play in this process.
As the case of the Free Software Foundation demonstrates,
notions of quality that drive social practice to generate and
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maintain its standards of excellence can be powerful forces
for change.  These views are compatible, in that a social
practice of OSS development can become a social movement
(Hertel et al. 2003; von Hippel and von Krogh 2003).  They
are also complementary, in that collective action emphasizes
the “struggle over meanings of new issues and technologies”
(Hargrave and Van de Ven 2006, p. 884) across social move-
ments, whereas social practice focuses on the quest for higher
quality products, more profound knowledge, and improved
collaboration in creating internal goods.
Collectively, we have merely begun to scratch the surface of
a full exploration of developers’ motivations for contributing
to OSS development.  There are vast research opportunities in
all areas covered in this theory and review piece.  The motiva-
tions across OSS projects could, for example, be investigated
productively using self-determination theory.  Three topics in
particular could stimulate interesting research from a self-
determination perspective.  First, future research can incor-
porate ethical considerations in self-determination models,
since ethics is integral to the OSS phenomenon per se.  Self-
determination theory would suggest the existence of both
intrinsic and extrinsic ethical motives.  Disentangling these
ethical motives and linking them to types and levels of
involvement would be an important contribution.  The
motivation–practice framework, in turn, suggests that ethical
considerations are geared toward the virtues and standards of
excellence of the social practice.  For example, self-
determination research could fruitfully explore how devel-
opers are intrinsically motivated to maintain standards of
excellence.  Again, the motivation–practice framework is
complementary since it explains how standards of excellence
are formed collectively through active participation in the
social practice over time.
Second, our argument that social practice moves individuals
to act may inform future applications of self-determination
theory in two ways.  Ethical considerations may not only
directly motivate individuals to act, but also condition what is
self-determined.  Cultural analysis in social sciences recently
shifted to treating culture “as constitutive of a wide range of
social processes rather than a regulative that works against
other forces, such as interests or rationality” (Weber and
Dacin 2011, p. 287; see also Boltanski and Thévenot 2006).
Motivation studies using self-determination theory should
explore if and to what extent a contextual and cultural
substrate impacts the confines of what individuals experience
as self-determined action.  Further, the social practice per-
spective suggests a carefully paced integration of temporal
aspects to context when designing studies using self-
determination theory.  In other words, the perspective points
to potential changes in motivation over time triggered by
exposure to and integration in a specific context.  Self-
determination models in the reviewed literature treated con-
text as developer-external and static and thus not accountable
for motivational dynamics.  For example, self-determination
research could investigate motivational differences between
groups of developers with different lengths and types of
contextual exposure to OSS projects.
Third, the understanding of how OSS institutions (e.g., stan-
dards, licenses, governance, copyright, and IP assignments)
and supporting umbrella organizations relate to developers’
self-determined motivations is only beginning to emerge and
many questions remain unanswered.  With the growth of
social networking sites and online communities (Wiertz and
de Ruyter 2007; Wasko and Faraj 2005), countless other
practitioners apart from software developers rely on volunteer
contributions and institutions such as open content licenses. 
Obviously, motivation research on the OSS phenomenon may
inform research designs in other domains, and vice versa.
To conclude, while there is ample room to investigate
motivation in OSS from a multitude of perspectives and
methodological approaches, we believe the greatest research
opportunities lie in those questions found at the intersection
between social practices and institutions, against which
individual motivations can and should be understood.
Figuring out what moves people, we should start with the
assertion that people’s pursuit of visible carrots is at times
interrupted by the larger quest for the invisible gold at the end
of the rainbow.
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Appendix A
Review Sample
Article Data/Method
Alexy and Leitner 2011 Scenario experiment with 229 European computer science students testing the effect of monetary
rewards on intrinsic motivation of OSS developers.
Baldwin and Clark 2006 Models relationship between modular code bases and developers’ incentives to join and remain
involved in OSS development based on option value and game theory.
Benkler 2002 Theory paper trying to explain advantages of commons-based peer-production.
Berquist and Ljungberg
2001
Virtual ethnography using archival data from news groups and discussion lists trying to explain the
power of gifts in OSS development.
Bitzer et al. 2007 Formal modeling aiming to explain the importance of intrinsic motivation in OSS development.
David and Shapiro 2008 Cluster analysis of data from David et al. (2003) to create motivation profiles.
David et al. 2003 Global online survey of 1,588 self-selected OSS developers.
Fershtman and Gandal
2007
Investigates the relationship between output and license restrictiveness using a sample of the 71
most active projects hosted on SourceForge.
Ghosh 2005 Survey with 2,700 respondents investigating e.g., demographics, motivations, and contributions.
Hars and Ou 2002 Online survey of 81 OSS developers aiming to explain participation.
Haruvy et al. 2003 Formal modeling aiming to explain how non-pecuniary benefits impact on OSS contribution.
Hemetsberger 2004 Content analysis of online survey responses of 1,139 OSS developers and users aiming to explain
contribution.
Hertel et al. 2003 Online survey of 141 OSS developers of the Linux kernel.
Ke and Zhang 2008 Online survey of 204 OSS participants aiming to explain effort intensity.
Lakhani and von Hippel
2003
Online survey of 336 contributors to the Apache web server software.  
Lakhani and Wolf 2005 Online survey of 684 SourceForge developers.
Lattemann and Stieglitz
2005
Reviews literature with the aim to identify factors that sustain motivation over the life cycle of an
open source project.  
Lee and Cole 2003 Uses archival data analyses, online research publications, and observations of how the Linux
technology has evolved to create a community-based model of knowledge creation.
MIS Quarterly Vol. 36 No. 2–Appendices/June 2012 A1
von Krogh et al./Motivation and Social Practice in OSS Development
Article Data/Method
Lerner and Tirole 2002 Uses four cases and descriptive statistics to highlight the extent to which economics can explain
OSS participation (“career concerns”).
Luthiger and Jungwirth
2007
Two surveys of 1,330 open source developers and 114 closed source developers to explore
motivation from a "flow theory" perspective.  
Markus 2007 Review and synthesis of OS governance literature.
Okoli and Oh 2007 Examines the impact of network closure and structural holes on social capital by using a sample of
465 Wikipedia participants.
O’Mahony and Ferraro
2007
Inductive ethnography exploring the evolution of governance structure and a logit regression model
testing factors that increase the likelihood of becoming a leader.
Oreg and Nov 2008 Survey of 185 SourceForge users and 115 Wikipedia participants investigating individual motivation.
Osterloh and Rota 2007 Conceptual article exploring OSS characteristics that enable low-cost contributions and lower
barriers to entry, and provide intrinsic motivation.
Riehle 2007 Examines firms’ and employees’ motivations to contribute to OSS development.
Roberts et al. 2006 Develops a model of motivation to participate in OSS development and tests it using data from an
email survey of 288 Apache developers.
Rullani 2007 Uses SourceForge project data to model how various variables explain "contribution."
Schofield and Cooper
2006
Survey of 145 members of Linux user groups.
Shah 2006 Inductively develops a framework of changing motivation over time depending on governance
structure using data from 88 qualitative interviews and archival data.
Spaeth et al. 2008 Case study examining private benefits of contributing to a public good.
Stewart et al. 2006 Investigates the effect of license restrictiveness and organizational sponsorship on developer activity
by examining 138 OSS projects on www.freshmeat.net.
Stewart and Gosain
2006
Assesses a PLS model on effectiveness in OSS development based on OSS beliefs, values, and
norms using survey data from 67 project administrators and SourceForge project data.
von Hippel and von
Krogh 2003
Conceptual article proposing the private-collective innovation model.
von Krogh et al. 2003 Multi-source, grounded approach examining [un]successful joining and specialization process into
www.freenetproject.org.
Wu et al. 2007 Develops a structural equation model to test the effect of motivations on satisfaction and intention
for continued participation using a SourceForge web survey with 148 responses (12% response
rate).
Xu et al. 2009 Develops a structural equation model to test the effect of motivation and community factors on
voluntary involvement in OSS projects using a SourceForge web survey with 172 responses (17%
response rate).
Ye and Kishida 2003 Investigates the importance of learning for motivation and provides descriptive statistics of the GIMP
project’s mailing list and code contribution behavior.  
Yu et al. 2007 Propose eight motivations that drive volunteering individuals’ motivation by creating hypotheses from
a model.
Zeitlyn 2003 Conceptual article proposing the concept of “kinship amity” in understanding OSS development.  
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Appendix B
Intrinsic Motivation
Ideology Ideology has been quoted as a major reason for starting the GNU project, one of the earliest coherent
attempts to write software under an explicitly open license (Stallman 1999).  The extent to which
contributors adhere to ideology is usually captured by items such as “software should be free for all,”
“free to modify and redistribute,” or that “open source code should replace proprietary software.”
Key empirical findings:
• Support for ideological motives found in developer surveys (David and Shapiro 2008; David et al.
2003; Ghosh 2005; Lakhani and Wolf 2005).
• Weak support by Hemetsberger (2004).
• Hertel et al. (2003) found a positive, significant relationship between social and political motives,
and accepted source code patches and lines of code contributions.
• Stewart and Gosain (2006) found that open source developers’ adherence to the community
ideology (defined as “open source” norms, values, and beliefs) impacts on team effectiveness.
• Yu et al. (2007) identified “moral obligation” and “advancement of virtual community motive” as
individual motivations in a literature review.
Altruism Altruism is the selfless concern for the welfare of others.  A typical altruistic act consists of three
characteristics:  “a) it is an end in itself; it is not directed at gain, b) is emitted voluntarily, and c) does
good” (Heider 1958 in Krebs 1970, p. 259).  Due to the self-containment of an altruistic act, it fits well
with the category of intrinsic motivation, and several authors have used the concept of altruism to
explain code contribution of OSS developers.  
Key empirical findings:
• Osterloh and Rota (2007) suggested that altruistic behavior caused by “pro-social motives”
influences developers to contribute to OSS development.  The “pro-social motive” is a type of
intrinsic motivation (Lindenberg 2001, quoted in Osterloh and Rota 2007), which the authors link
to open source contributions.
• Haruvy et al. (2003) point out that companies need to manage contributors’ motivations so as not
to crowd out their altruistic motives.
• Wu et al. (2007) investigated the intention of OSS developers to continue their involvement in
future projects.  Their structural equation model shows that altruism in the form of helping behavior
influences developers’ continuance only if mediated by their satisfaction.  
• Hemetsberger (2004) reported that 22% of developers ranked altruism as a motivational factor to
contribute.  Hemetsberger also attempted to differentiate between types of developer and found
that the importance of altruism in explaining contributions is stronger for people who contribute a
lot (30.7%), compared to medium (23.9%) and low contributors (6.5%).  
• Hars and Ou (2002) reported that altruism motivated developers to contribute: 16.5% of the survey
participants rated high on altruism.  Student and hobby programmers rated altruism the highest at
24.2%, followed by salaried and contract programmers at 11.1%, whereas only 7.7% of the
programmers paid for open source development were driven by altruistic motivations.  
• Ghosh’s (2005) survey finds selfish behavior to such a degree as to rule out altruistic behavior as
an important characteristic of OSS development, although altruism is a driver for some individuals.
• Bitzer et al. (2007) identify the “desire to give a present to the programmer community” as a crucial
pattern in OSS literature and include it in a model.
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Kinship amity The concept of kinship amity (Fortes 1969) has been related to the concept of the gift economy (Zeitlyn
2003).  However, kinship amity differs from the gift economy, since the former does not assume
reciprocity in social relations.  For example, there is no calculated economic relationship in families
(kin).  Kinship amity thus also differs from altruism as a motive to contribute, because it is restricted to
the group to which one belongs, such as the OSS community.  In our review, some equivalent
constructs are subsumed under kinship amity, for example, the frequently cited motivation for OSS
contributors, community identification (e.g., Hars and Ou 2002).  Community identification instills a
feeling of belonging to a certain group, and urges people to help others in that group.  
Key empirical findings:
• Zeitlyn (2003) first suggested kinship amity as a motive in OSS and as an explanation for why
people contribute to OSS.
• Hemetsberger (2004), using concepts such as “group boundaries” and “group bonds,” found a
weak relationship between kinship amity and developers’ level of contribution.  
• Lakhani and Wolf’s (2005) survey identified kinship amity as an important motive for contributing,
and showed it is an important determinant of the effort invested (hours per week).  Other surveys
(David and Shapiro 2008; Hars and Ou 2002) find similar results.  Hars and Ou (2002) studied
“community identification,” finding a correlation between kinship amity and the number of hours per
week spent on OSS contribution.
• Hertel et al. (2003) tested the relationship between kinship amity and the number of accepted
patches and lines of code, and found it to be positive and significant.
Enjoyment and fun Enjoyment and fun have been said to motivate contributors to open source projects.  One of the main
drivers of the so called “hacker culture” emerging during the 1980s was for developers to enjoy the
playfulness and experimentation with hardware and software (Levy 1984; Torvalds and Diamond 2002).
Key empirical findings:
• Benkler (2002) and Osterloh and Rota (2007) suggested that enjoyment plays an important role
in OSS.
• Lakhani and von Hippel (2003) showed in their survey that developers considered enjoyment and
fun important when conducting technically challenging tasks, whereas mundane tasks, such as
helping users to install software, required different motives.  
• Luthiger and Jungwirth (2007) conducted the most comprehensive study focusing exclusively on
fun and enjoyment motivations.  Their survey of 1,330 open source developers revealed that the
fun factor had a significantly positive effect on both the number of hours spent on a project as well
as on developers’ intention to participate in the future.  Fun accounted for 28% of the effort in terms
of number of hours dedicated to projects.  
• Lakhani and Wolf (2005) found that developers deemed enjoyment-based motivation an important
source of motivation.  In their research, high levels of enjoyment also increased the hours per week
that developers spent on a project.  
• Hertel et al. (2003), measuring the number of accepted patches and lines of code in the Linux
project, also found a significant positive impact of fun and enjoyment.  
• Hemetsberger’s (2004) survey identified modest positive impact of enjoyment on contributions to
projects.
• Shah (2006) showed that own-use value often formed the initial reason to join development, but
over time fun and enjoyment increasingly form the sustaining motivation to long-term contribution.
• Roberts et al. (2006) could not identify a significant link between intrinsic enjoyment and the
number of accepted patches and lines of code.
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Appendix C
Internalized Extrinsic Motivation
Reputation Reputation can be classified as “peer reputation” and “outside reputation.” Peer reputation is usually
targeted at community insiders (peers, or kin) and potential employers who perceive peer reputation
to signal talent.  Very few studies have considered reputation directed outside the community and not
targeted toward potential future employers.  Outside reputation is concerned with anticipated reactions
to the contributors by significant others, such as friends and relatives, and prestige awarded.
Key empirical findings:
• Raymond’s (1998) essay “Homesteading the Noosphere” linked reputation to reciprocity in the gift
economy and described it as the “major motivation” for developers.
• Lerner and Tirole (2002) proposed peer reputation as a fundamental motivation.
• Osterloh and Rota (2007) termed this motivation “ego gratification,” which could easily be confused
with intrinsically motivated self-determination, the happiness of having/being able to achieve
something (see Deci and Ryan 1987).  However, the authors classify it as an extrinsic signaling
incentive, aimed at increasing one’s own labor market value.  
• Lakhani and von Hippel (2003) differentiated peer reputation further.  They proposed that peer
reputation motivates “gratifying” technical tasks, while it fails to motivate the “necessary but
mundane tasks” that are an inherent part of each software project.
• Lattemann and Stieglitz (2005) proposed that contributors’ roles are related to motivations.  In their
view, programmers (rather than bug fixers, or managers) were motivated through peer reputation.
• Spaeth et al. (2008) argued that some motives are formed as by-products of contributions.  In their
empirical study of the Freenet project, the authors found that higher levels of contributions provided
more peer reputation, such as positive mentioning in e-mail lists.  
• The surveys by Ghosh (2005), Hars and Ou (2002), Hemetsberger (2004), and Lakhani and Wolf
(2005) reported peer reputation as a driver for participation.  
• Hars and Ou (2002) identified a weak but existing relationship between reputation and the number
of hours invested.  
• Lakhani and Wolf (2005) found peer reputation to be the fourth biggest determinant of invested
effort.
• Roberts et al. (2006) measured the accepted lines of code.  They identified a significant positive
relationship between peer reputation motives and accepted code in the Apache project.
• Hemetsberger (2004) found a weak relationship between outside reputation and participation.
• Hertel et al. (2003) tested the impact of outside reputation on the number of accepted patches and
lines of code.  Ceteris paribus they found a significant positive impact of outside motivation on
accepted code.
Gift economy/
Reciprocity
Originally a concept from anthropology (Mauss 1959), several authors discussed the logic of gift-giving
in the context of OSS development (Bergquist and Ljungberg 2001; Raymond 1999; Zeitlyn 2003). 
Viewing OSS development as a gift economy asserts that developers give code to others expecting
gifts in return.  The corresponding internalized, extrinsic motivation can be termed “reciprocity.”
Key empirical findings:
• Bergquist and Ljungberg (2001) suggested reciprocity as a motivation for contributions to OSS.
• Hemetsberger (2004) and Lakhani and Wolf (2005) confirmed reciprocity in empirical studies that
found moderate support, while David et al. (2003) found strong support.
• In their survey, Lakhani and von Hippel (2003) found that reciprocity motivated developers to
perform mundane tasks.  It seems that people who have been helped by other contributors in the
past are more inclined to reciprocate as they gain experience and knowledge.
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Learning The motive to acquire new skills or to learn through OSS development appears in almost every
contribution to the review sample.  However, the definition of learning was often vague and referred to
survey items such as “improve programming skills” (the opportunity to learn from the experience of
writing software and the feedback provided by the peers who tested, integrated, and commented upon
the software published).
Key empirical findings:
• von Hippel and von Krogh (2003) proposed that learning poses a private benefit derived from the
contributions to OSS development (also proposed by Yu et al. 2007).  Spaeth et al. (2008)
confirmed in an empirical study that learning through feedback is a driver for participation.
• Survey studies confirmed that “learning” motivated individuals to participate (Ghosh 2005;
Hemetsberger 2004; Lakhani and Wolf 2005; Oreg and Nov 2008; Roberts et al. 2006), particularly
in the surveys by David et al. (2003) and Hars and Ou (2002).
• Roberts et al. (2006) additionally show that accepted patches and lines of code written were
positively impacted by learning.  
• Wu et al. (2007) found that learning motives led to a higher intention to participate.  
• Ye and Kishida (2003) suggested the consideration of legitimate peripheral learning based on the
work by Lave and Wenger (1991) to explain increasing levels of participation over time (see also
Rullani 2007).
• Xu et al. (2009) also find “skill development” to be a driver, although they refer to future work
opportunities, rather than learning as a goal in itself.
• Stewart and Gosain (2006) see “learning as a value in itself” as a dimension of the “OSS values”
construct that impacts effort positively via “affective trust.”
Own-use value Own-use value refers to internalized extrinsic motives to create OSS for contributors’ personal use.
Key empirical findings:
• Lakhani and von Hippel (2003), Osterloh and Rota (2007), and Raymond (1999) suggested
developers of OSS “scratch their itch” by developing software they find useful, by fixing bugs, and
by adding features they need.
• Surveys by David et al. (2003), Ghosh (2005), Hars and Ou (2002), Lakhani and Wolf (2005), as
well as Hemetsberger (2004) identified own-use value as a motive for participating in the
development of OSS.
• Wu et al. (2007) found own-use value was connected to the intention to participate.
• Lakhani and von Hippel (2003) identified own-use value as a motive for taking on mundane tasks. 
• Hars and Ou (2002) reported that developers attributed a high score to own-use value as their
motive regarding actual effort measured in hours spent per week.
• Hertel et al. (2003) reported that own-use value had a significant effect on accepted patches and
lines of code contributed.  
• Roberts et al. (2006) reported that own-use value exerted a significant negative impact on the level
of participation in the Apache project, also measured in accepted patches and lines of code.  One
explanation offered is that developers motivated by own-use value worked “eclectically”:  they
would fix bugs that annoyed them and then leave the development again, rather than remaining
as long-term developers.  This behavior would result in relatively low total contributions to one
project.  
• Lattemann and Stieglitz (2005) proposed that own-use value might impact on OSS development
via the roles individuals assume in communities.  Contributors who mainly fix bugs may be
particularly motivated by own-use value, whereas others such as managers (maintainers), might
be more motivated by pay.
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Appendix D
Extrinsic Motivation
Career Lerner and Tirole (2002) first suggested studying the signaling behavior of OSS developers.  Their
proposition, derived from economic literature, stated that individual developers would be motivated by
career concerns when developing OSS.  By publishing software that was free for all to inspect, they
could signal their talent to potential employers and thus increase their value in the labor market.  
Key empirical findings:
• Has been proposed by Lerner and Tirole (2002), Riehle (2007), Yu et al. (2007) as motivation.
• Some surveys including Lakhani and Wolf (2005), Hemetsberger (2004) found weak support for
career concerns as motivation.
• Hars and Ou (2002) and Ghosh (2005) found more substantial support for career concerns as
motivation.
• Wu et al. (2007) found career concerns related to intended participation.  
• Hars and Ou (2002) found strong support of the motivation for efforts measured in hours per week
spent on OSS development.  They also report that career concerns played a more important role
for paid participation in OSS development than for unpaid participation.  
• Roberts et al. (2006) and Hertel et al. (2003) documented a positive and significant relationship
between career concerns, accepted code patches and lines of code.  
• Xu et al. (2009) use a single construct—“Reputation and Skill Gaining”—which they state “may help
the developer’s future work opportunities” (2009, p. 153), driving involvement.
Pay A significant minority (approximately 40%) of contributors is paid to participate in OSS projects (Lakhani
and Wolf 2005).  An examination of contributions to the Linux kernel found only 9% of the developers
involved worked in their own time (Kroah-Hartman et al. 2009).
Key empirical findings:
• Lakhani and Wolf (2005) examined the degree of participation and its link to financial motives. 
They concluded that the financial subsidy of these projects was substantial.  For example, paid
contributors dedicated 17.7 hours per week on all FOSS projects they participated in, while
volunteers contributed 11.7 hours per week.  As programmers often participate in several projects
simultaneously, Lakhani and Wolf reported the results for the focal project of the programmers as
well.  These results showed a similar pattern: 10.3 hour per week for the paid contributor and 5.7
hours per week for the volunteer.  The differences between the groups were found to be significant. 
• Surveys by Hars and Ou (2002), Hertel et al. (2003), and Luthiger and Jungwirth (2007) reported
findings consistent with Lakhani and Wolf (2005).
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